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ABSTRACT 
IT outsourcing (ITO) refers to the shift of IT/IS activities from internal to external 
of an organization. In prior research, the governance of ITO is recognized with 
persistent strategic importance for practice, because it is tightly related to ITO 
success. Under the rapid transformation of global market, the evolving practice of 
ITO requires updated knowledge on effective governance. However, research on 
ITO governance is still under developed due to the lack of integrated theoretical 
frameworks and the variety of empirical settings besides dyadic client-vendor 
relationships. Especially, as multi-sourcing has become an increasingly common 
practice in ITO, its new governance challenges must be attended by both ITO 
researchers and practitioners.  
To address this research gap, this study aims to understand multi-sourcing 
governance with an integrated theoretical framework incorporating both 
governance structure and governance mechanisms. The focus is on the emerging 
deviations among formal, perceived and practiced governance. With an 
interpretive perspective, a single case study is conducted with mixed methods of 
Social Network Analysis (SNA) and qualitative inquiries. The empirical setting 
embraces one client firm and its two IT suppliers for IT infrastructure services. 
The empirical material is analyzed at three levels: within one supplier firm, 
between the client and one supplier, and among all three firms. Empirical 
evidences, at all levels, illustrate various deviations in governance mechanisms, 
with which emerging governance structures are shaped.  
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of ITO governance in three 
domains: the governance of ITO in general, the governance of multi-sourcing in 
particular, and research methodology. For ITO governance in general, this study 
has identified two research strands of governance structure and governance 
mechanisms, and integrated both concepts under a unified framework. The 
composition of four research papers contributes to multi-sourcing research by 
illustrating the benefits of zooming in and out across the multilateral relationships 
with different aspects and scopes. Methodologically, the viability and benefit of 
mixed-method is illustrated and confirmed for both researchers and practitioners. 
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IT-palveluiden ulkoistamisen tarkoituksena on hankkia organisaation tarvitsemat 
IT-palvelut toiselta organisaatiolta. Hankittavien palveluiden laatu on aiemman 
tutkimuksen mukaan riippunut siitä, miten palveluiden ulkoistusta on hallittu. 
Aihepiiristä ei kuitenkaan ole olemassa integroitua tieteellistä viitekehystä. Lisäksi 
aiempi IT-palveluiden hallintaa käsittelevä empiirinen tutkimus on perehtynyt 
vain kahdenvälisiin asiakas–tuottaja suhteisiin. Tämän johdosta on tärkeää tutkia 
lisää IT-palveluiden ulkoistamisen hallintaa yleensä ja erityisesti niissä tilanteissa, 
joissa IT-palvelut on ulkoistettu useille toimijoille eli kyse on IT-palveluiden 
moniulkoistamisesta.  
Tässä tutkimuksessa kehitettiin IT-palveluiden moniulkoistamisen hallintaan 
soveltuva integroitu, tieteellinen viitekehys, joka sisältää sekä hallinnan rakenteet 
että hallinnan mekanismit. Työn empiirisessä osassa erityisenä kiinnostuksen 
kohteena oli se, mitä palvelun hallinnasta oli virallisesti sovittu, kuinka eri 
osapuolet olettivat hallinnan tapahtuvan, ja miten hallinta käytännössä toteutui. 
Aihetta tutkittiin tulkitsevan tapaustutkimuksen keinoin yhdistäen 
puolistrukturoitua haastattelututkimusta ja sosiaalisten verkostojen analyysiä. 
Tutkimusaineisto kerättiin yhdestä asiakasyrityksestä ja sen kahdesta IT-
palveluiden toimittajasta. Aineiston analysointi tehtiin kolmella tasolla: yksittäisen 
toimittajayrityksen, asiakkaan ja toimittajan välisen suhteen sekä kaikkien 
toimijoiden välisten suhteiden tasolla. 
Tutkimuksessa osoitetaan, että aiempi IT-palveluiden ulkoistamisen hallintaa 
käsittelevä tutkimus on jakautunut kahteen tutkimusalueeseen, joista toinen 
keskittyy hallinnan mekanismeihin ja toinen hallinnan rakenteisiin. Tutkimuksessa 
kehitetty IT-palveluiden ulkoistamisen hallinnan uusi viitekehys hyödyntää sekä 
hallinnan mekanismeihin että hallinnan rakenteisiin liittyviä käsitteitä. Tutkielma 
osoittaa, että moniulkoistamiseen liittyviä toimijoita kannattaa analysoida sekä 
itsenäisinä toimijoina että verkoston jäseninä. Tutkimus nostaa myös esille hyötyjä 
laadullisten ja määrällisten tutkimusmenetelmien yhdistämisestä sekä tieteellisen 
tutkimuksen tekemisessä että yritysten käytännön kehitystyössä. 
 
Avainsanat: IT-palveluiden ulkoistus, IT-palveluiden ulkoistaminen, ulkoistuksen 
hallinta, ulkoistamisen hallinta, moniulkoistaminen, monimenetelmätutkimus, 
tapaustutkimus 
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Since Kodak’s landmark outsourcing deal in 1989, the research of Information 
Technology Outsourcing (ITO) 1  has attracted increasing attention among 
Information Systems (IS) scholars. As a highly practice-oriented research stream, 
the definition of ITO has evolved together with the evolution of outsourcing 
practice (Dibbern, Goles, Hirschheim, & Jayatilaka, 2004; Hätönen & Eriksson, 
2009). In general, IS literature views outsourcing as a shift of production and/or 
process venue of IT/IS activities from internal to external of an organization; 
whereas the evolution of its conceptualization pertains to the nature of client-
vendor relationship, from a cost-driven contracting-out to a risk-sharing and long-
term partnership, as the scope and scale of outsourcing has expanded dramatically 
in practice. Today, besides cost reduction, practitioners expect to achieve more 
strategic goals through outsourcing, such as accessing external resources through 
“sustainable win-win relationships” to enhance their competitive advantage 
(Gartner, 2015). 
Unlike a decade ago, when Dibbern et al. (2004) acknowledged client-vendor 
relationship as a research gap, in today’s ITO research, our understanding on this 
topic is increasingly wider and deeper (e.g. Gonzalez, Gasco, & Llopis, 2006). 
However, despite the rich knowledge obtained in prior research, the client-vendor 
relationship is evolving all the time in practice, for which constant renewal of 
theoretical understandings is necessary. According to the outsourcing index of 
Information Service Group (ISG, 2015), the number of mega-relationships with 
over $100 million annual contract value (ACV) have shrunk rapidly, whereas 
smaller deals with ACV lower than $40 million have become the driven force of 
the global outsourcing market. Particularly in ITO, with the fast changing 
technologies and evolving operational models, flexibility becomes an essential 
demand, which also entails shorter contracts and lower costs. Thus industrial 
buyers started to avoid long-term and large deals, such as IT infrastructure, and 
increasingly sign contracts for specialized cloud and other IT services provided by 
smaller vendors. Moreover, such smaller contracts are often heavily multi-sourced 
to different vendors. The evolved nature of ITO relationships have posed new 
                                                 
1 In this dissertation, ITO is used as a broad notion to address outsourcing phenomenon in the field of 
Information Systems (IS) research. Thus I do not intend to differentiate ITO with other similar terms, such 
as IS outsourcing, which are rather treated as synonyms in this study. 
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challenges on relationship management, especially on the governance of ITO 
under such transformation of global market. In prior research, ITO governance is 
recognized with persistent strategic importance for practice, because it is tightly 
related to ITO success (Lacity, Khan, & Willcocks, 2009). However, research on 
ITO governance is still under development, owing to the scarcity of empirical 
studies with an integrated theoretical framework, as well as the lack of variety in 
empirical settings other than dyadic client-vendor relationships.  
In ITO literature, the concept of governance is predominantly framed by the 
theory of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) (Gonzalez et al., 2006; Lacity & 
Hirschheim, 1993; Williamson, 1975). In this view, the mechanism of contract has 
been emphasized to govern ITO as a form of transaction. However, due to the 
increasing importance of post-contractual collaboration in ITO where “incomplete 
contracts” emerges (e.g. Gefen, Wyss, & Lichtenstein, 2008), the lens of TCE 
becomes incomprehensive, and additional theoretical lenses focusing on relational 
aspects are needed. Based on theoretical and empirical focuses, prior studies on 
ITO governance can be divided into two strands: governance structure and 
governance mechanisms. Although theoretical efforts have been presented on 
integrating these two strands into one theoretical framework (e.g. Miranda & 
Kavan, 2005), such studies are still scarce; especially, we still lack empirical 
studies to support such theoretical integration.  
On the variety of ITO relationships, most of our prior understandings on the 
phenomenon of ITO governance are based on empirical settings of traditional ITO 
dyads, i.e. relationship between one client and one vendor. Nowadays, multi-
sourcing, i.e. outsourcing to multiple vendors, has become an increasingly 
common practice in ITO (ISG, 2014), and its new challenges must be attended by 
both ITO researchers and practitioners (Bapna, Barua, Mani, & Mehra, 2010). For 
instance, different vendors, who are usually competitors, would have to collaborate 
to achieve the client’s business goal; moreover, the geographically dispersed 
nature of multiple vendors, which is more and more common with the 
globalization, might bring further complications to such collaboration. 
Furthermore, new challenges are also posed to the IT function in the client 
organization, calling for updated capabilities to co-create value with multiple 
vendors (Lempinen & Rajala, 2014). Therefore, in addition to our knowledge 
based on dyadic relationships, more research is needed to advance the 
understanding of ITO governance in this new context with multiple vendors. 
Indeed, different multi-sourcing researches have emerged in recent years on 
various aspects, such as multi-sourcing decisions (Bapna, Gupta, Ray, & Singh, 
2013; Cullen, Seddon, & Willcocks, 2005), vendor portfolio selection (Fridgen & 
Mueller, 2011), vendors’ knowledge transfer (Schott, 2011), and recommended 
management practices (Beck, Schott, & Gregory, 2011). The topic of multi-
sourcing governance, though recognized as a crucial aspect to manage the 
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complexities and interdependencies in multi-sourcing (Bapna et al., 2010), is still 
under developed.  
Motivated by such research gaps in ITO governance, this study aims to 
understand the governance of multi-sourcing with an integrated theoretical 
framework incorporating both governance structure and governance mechanisms.  
1.2 Research question 
As mentioned in the last section, the outsourcing practice has been evolving 
constantly in the global market, thus the corresponding governance needs to adapt 
to such evolution. Especially in the multi-sourcing of IT, the persistent interaction 
between client and vendors further entails the governance model to be frequently 
reviewed and updated. Under such dynamic context, the practice of governance 
will deviate, more often than not, from the pre-defined formal governance model. 
Besides, such practice may also deviate from participants’ ex-ante perception of 
governance. While prior studies have shed light on developing prescriptive 
governance models for ITO success (Koh, Ang, & Straub, 2004; Saunders, Gebelt, 
& Hu, 1997), today’s market situation calls for an alternative approach to 
understand governance, starting from what actually happens in practice to inform 
adaptive decisions to update the formal model. Therefore in this study, I choose to 
explore the emerging deviations among formal, perceived and practiced 
governance. Accordingly, the main research question is formulated:  
 
RQ: How does governance practice deviate from the formal and perceived 
governance model in IT multi-sourcing? 
 
To answer the research question, the following sub-questions are scrutinized 
within a real-life multi-sourcing scenario in each of the empirical papers: 
 How do vendor’s interpersonal networks deviate from their perceived 
governance structure? (Paper 2) 
 How does governance practice deviate from the ITO contract between 
client and one of the vendors? (Paper 3) 
 How does practice deviate from perception in the ITO governance among 
client and multiple vendors? (Paper 4) 
 
The research question has set the stage for this research, focusing on the 
comparison among the formal stipulations, perception, and the practice of 
governance. The formal governance model accords to the stipulations related to 
governance in formal documents such as the contract. The perceived governance, 
on the other hand, lies in the perceptual experience of participants from multiple 
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parties. Last but not least, the practice of governance is observed from the 
routinized and ad-hoc activities of participants, including interpersonal 
communication networks as an important aspect. In the research papers, 
comparisons are conducted through different methods (see Chapter 3) on the basis 
of the conceptualization of governance, including governance structures and 
governance mechanisms (see Chapter 2). An overview of the included research 
papers will be presented in the next section. 
1.3 Research setting and overview 
This dissertation consists of two parts, an overview and a collection of research 
papers. The first part is organized in five chapters to summarize and synthesize my 
doctoral study as a holistic effort1. This first chapter sets the stage for the research 
topic with the motivation and research questions, as well as an overview of the 
dissertation.  
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background. It starts from a review of 
literature reviews on ITO, providing an overall landscape of the research field to 
position this study. Then, the concept of ITO governance is scrutinized based on 
prior research on this specific topic. Finally, the focusing context of IT multi-
sourcing is reviewed with descriptions of different multi-sourcing models and the 
specific requirement of governance in this context.  
Following the theoretical background, Chapter 3 introduces the methodology 
adopted in this study. Besides general discussion on the chosen philosophical 
perspective and case study methodology, the empirical case is also described in 
this chapter. Furthermore, the approach of mixed-methods is elaborated in details, 
including the elaboration of purpose, the conduct of each method, and how the 
methods are integrated. In addition, the implementation of methods in each 
research paper is also summarized in this chapter. 
The last two chapters synthesize the findings and conclude this study with key 
implications. Chapter 4 is an overview of findings from each research paper. 
Besides the summaries, this chapter also shows how each sub-questions are 
answered, thus provides a holistic view to integrate the papers into this dissertation. 
In Chapter 5, the main research question is answered combining the implications 
from each paper. Last but not least, both theoretical and practical contributions are 
suggested, together with remarks on limitations and future research. 
As the second part of this dissertation, the collection of four research papers 
shows a dialogue between literature and empirical material in the conduct of this 
research. Paper 1 (Lin & Vaia, “The Concept of Governance in IT Outsourcing: A 
                                                 
1 These five chapters in the first part were developed with the intention to integrate the main theoretical 
rationales and contributions of individual research papers in the second part. Therefore, some necessary 
overlap between the two parts may be observed. 
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Literature Review”, ECIS 2015) is a review on ITO governance literature, in order 
to synthesize prior conceptualizations on this topic, identify research gaps and 
support the positioning of this research. In my research, I have opted for an 
iterative process in literature and empirical study, in which the review of literature 
is not aiming to pre-define hypotheses or research frameworks, but rather 
conducted in parallel with the empirical study. Through the analysis of data, more 
understandings are generated on the research question; accordingly, the selection 
and analysis of literature are more and more purposeful and relevant throughout 
the iteration. Therefore, though this paper is almost the last one to be finalized, the 
relevant literature has been reviewed and analysed since the beginning of my 
research (Figure 1). For the same reason, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2, the 
empirical papers are not associated with chronological order, but rather as building 
blocks constructing the full case. 
 
 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Phase 1: Literature review 
              and research design 
        
     
Phase 2: Data collection       
     
Phase 3: Data analysis       
     
Phase 4: Writing and 
publishing 
      
     
   Paper 3 Paper 2 Paper 1 & 
Paper 4 
     
Figure 1 Research process 
The empirical study is presented in the rest three papers, illustrating the single 
case study I have conducted on a multi-sourcing setting for IT services. In 2012 
(Figure 1), the empirical material was collected in all involved firms within this 
multi-sourcing relationship, including one client firm (CL) and its two IT suppliers 
(SP1 and SP2) 1 . A more detailed case description will be presented in the 
methodology chapter. Here it is worth mentioning that this case study is not only 
motivated by the research opportunities revealed in the literature review, but also 
initiated by my former work contacts in the client firm. Thus, from the very 
beginning, this research is conceived with both purposes of theoretical contribution 
and practical impact. Due to the complexity of the case, several sub-cases are 
constructed in the empirical papers for a complete storyline. Paper 2 (Lin & 
                                                 
1 For anonymity, I used different pseudonyms for the client and supplier firms in different papers. The client 
is referred to as Beta (Paper 2), NI (Paper 3), and CL (Paper 4); the first supplier is referred to as Alpha 
(Paper 3), KIM (Paper 2), and SP1 (Paper 4); the second supplier is only analysed in Paper 4, and is referred 
to as SP2. Here in the overview chapters, the pseudonyms of Paper 4 is followed. 
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Hekkala, “Governance Structure in IT Outsourcing: a Perspective of Interpersonal 
Networks”, Strategic Outsourcing: An International Journal. Forthcoming) is an 
intra-organizational case study from SP1’s perspective, aiming to explore and 
empirically understand how governance mechanisms manifested by interpersonal 
networks can reflect and influence the perceived ITO governance structure. Paper 
3 (Lin, “IT Outsourcing at the Stage OF Psychological Contract: Governance-in-
Practice and Governance-in-Contract”, ECIS 2013) copes with the ITO dyad 
between CL and SP1, which empirically contrasted the governance structure 
revealed by different mechanisms respectively in practice and in contract. Last but 
not least, Paper 4 (Lin, “Multi-Sourcing Governance: in Perception and in 
Practice”, GSW 2015) examines the multi-sourcing relationships involving all 
three parties of CL, SP1 and SP2. It shows how the difference of governance 
mechanisms, in perception and in practice of each involved party, can cause the 
divergence of governance structure, which ultimately raised various conflicts in 
different relationships of multi-sourcing (i.e. between CL and SP1, between CL 
and SP2, and between SP1 and SP2), especially between the two vendors. This 
paper also brings implications on how to re-structure the governance of such multi-
sourcing relationships. The association among empirical papers is shown in Figure 
2.  
 










2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
This chapter constructs the theoretical background of this research. First, ITO as a 
general topic is first reviewed based on four seminal literature reviews. Then, the 
specific topic of ITO governance is summarized with two identified strands: 
governance structure and governance mechanisms. Moreover, the focused context 
of multi-sourcing is elaborated, revisiting different multi-sourcing models and ITO 
governance in this new context. Last but not least, this research is positioned based 
on the literature background. 
2.1 The research stream of ITO: A review of literature reviews 
As pertinent literature proliferates through the years, many literature reviews have 
emerged, providing syntheses on “what has been done on ITO research” from 
various perspectives and under diverse contexts. These literature reviews have also 
illustrated a rich picture of the research stream at different time slices of ITO 
history. To clarify research gaps and to position my own research, a review of these 
literature reviews will be beneficial. Thus I will start this chapter by introducing 
and discussing four major literature reviews on ITO in a historical order (Table 1). 
In the earliest comprehensive literature review on ITO, Dibbern, Goles, 
Hirschheim and Jayatilaka (2004) surveyed the first decade of outsourcing 
research involving a wide range of outlets, including nine mainstream IS journals, 
seven major management journals, three applied management publications, and 
two major IS conference proceedings. In their research framework, they identified 
five outsourcing stages, i.e. why, what, which, how, and outcome, to accommodate 
different research objectives out of the literature. Moreover, these five stages are 
further categorized into two main phases, namely decision process and 
implementation. This stage model of ITO, as depicted in Figure 3, is not only a 
good framework for analysing the ITO literature, but also a concise summary of 
the outsourcing lifecycle in practice.  
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Table 1 Literature reviews on ITO revisited 









1992–2000 84  Outsourcing stages 
 Theoretical foundations 




1988–2005 131  Research methodologies 
 Topics and scope 
 Authors and countries 
Lacity et 
al. (2009) 
1990–2008 191 Six topics relevant to practice: 
 Determinant of ITO 
 ITO strategy 
 ITO risks and mitigation 
 Success determinants 
 Client and supplier capabilities 
 ITO varietals 
Lacity et 
al. (2010) 
1992–2010 164  Dependent variables 
 Independent variables 
 Relationships between dependent 
and independent variables 
 
As a review on early literatures, Dibbern et al. (2004) delineate the historical 
landscape of ITO research during the years 1992-2000. They argue that the 
research domain was already maturing, having developed a diversity of focal 
objectives, theoretical bases and relevant methods during the first decades since 
the emergence of ITO practice. Similar to the lifecycle of ITO practice as 
illustrated in Figure 3, research attention had been shifted from the initial decision 
process to post-adoption implementation issues. By the end of last millennium, 
researchers had started to scrutinize the client-supplier relationship beyond the 
scope of outsourcing contract, including the psychological aspect of relations. A 
major contribution of this extensive literature review is the five research gaps 
identified by the authors, encouraging future research on (1) outsourcing success, 
(2) from vendors’ perspective, (3) on the client-vendor relationship, (4) on 
outsourcing process, and (5) with comparative methods. Today, some of the gaps 
have been bridged, e.g. the vendors’ perspective has been widely addressed, yet 
many of the gaps are still valid up to date. This will be presented in the subsequent 
introduction of other literature reviews. Future studies were also called for on 
several sourcing issues emerged in ITO practice during the first decade. Driving 
the change of research attention, the focus of outsourcing shifted from cost-saving 
to management consideration, such as to re-focus on core business. Meanwhile, 
the relationship between client and vendor increasingly evolved from “buyer” and 
“supplier” into alliances and partnerships. Moreover, different types of 
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outsourcing, including equity holding, offshoring, and Application Service 
Providing (ASP) were on the rise. In addition, due to the inconsistency of “hope” 
and “reality”, i.e. the initial purpose and the outcome of ITO practice, backsourcing 
became a key trend on the reverse direction of outsourcing.  These emerging issues 
have been extensively addressed during the years following the publication of this 
literature review; however, many of them are still highly relevant topics for new 
ITO research. 
 
Figure 3 Stages of outsourcing (Dibbern et al., 2004) 
Another literature review was conducted (Gonzalez et al., 2006) almost 
immediately following Dibbern et al. (2004). Compared to the latter, this review 
involves more studies, especially those published after the millennium (see Table 
1). They also identify one article written in 1988, but the term “facility 
management” was used instead of “outsourcing”. This dates back the research on 
outsourcing even before the “Kodak effect”. However, most of the articles indeed 
have emerged after 1989, and the proliferation of literature has especially 
accelerated since 2000. Methodologically, the analysis shows a clearly increasing 
popularity of empirical studies over time. This is consistent with Dibbern et al.’s 
(2004) assertion that the research of ITO is highly practice-oriented, and that 
theories pertaining to the field have been constantly developed and/or tested with 
empirical data. The authors categorize the most frequently researched topics into 
multiple perspectives to outsourcing (Figure 4), including the perspective of client, 






 Determinants for decision to outsource 
 Advantages/Disadvantages of outsourcing 
Alternatives of outsourcing, the degree of 
 ownership 
 IS functions to be outsourced 
Procedures and guidelines for assessment of 
viable choices and decision making 
 Vendor selection 
 Structuring contract and relationship 
 Managing outsourcing arrangement 
 Evaluation of outsourcing outcomes 
 Determinants of outsourcing success 













the perspectives, the client view still dominated this research field at that time, 
though a decrease of the research attention was observed. On the other way round, 
the number of articles from provider’s perspective had grown rapidly since 2001. 
This shows the active reaction of the research community mobilized by Dibbern et 
al.’s (2004) call for more attention on the vendor’s perspective. In addition, the 
authors attribute increased application of economic theories, as well as the 
tendency towards co-authorship, to the growing maturity of the research area, 
which is also consistent with the previous literature review (Dibbern et al., 2004). 
The authors have also traced the evolution of both classic and emerging topics with 
a longitudinal view (Figure 5). Over time, classic topics such as reasons for 
outsourcing and the general view of ITO phenomenon, although still topped the 
list with article numbers in total, became less discussed for that time being. Instead, 
the topics on client-vendor relationship had raised much more interest after 2001, 
addressing the related research gap and emerging trends suggested by Dibbern et 
al. (2004), i.e. research gap on client and vendor relationship and trend for the 
growth of alliances and partnerships. It is also worth noticing that new phenomena 
such as ASP and offshoring were paid significant attention, still in line with the 
emerging trends forecasted by Dibbern et al. (2004). Another interesting finding is 
that most of the analysed articles (77.1%) have neglected the scope of outsourcing, 
i.e. how much and which part of IT function is outsourced, only discussing ITO in 
general. This indicates that the “IT” part of “ITO” had been, to certain extent, 
overlooked by researchers at that time (see Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001). 
 













Figure 5 The most frequent ITO topics (Adapted from Gonzalez et al., 2006) 
To address the practice-oriented nature of ITO research, Lacity, Khan, and 
Willcocks’ (2009) review summarized the insights for key questions concerned by 
practitioners on six main topics (see Table 1). Corresponding to the historical 
development of ITO research, the first three topics, including (1) attributes of firms 
most likely to engage in ITO, (2) intent and effects of ITO strategy, and (3) ITO 
risks and mitigation, are more prevalent to the research focus in early 1990s; and 
the next three topics have been initiated since mid-1990s and developed through 
the late 2000s, focusing on (4) success determinants, (5) client and supplier 
capabilities, as well as (6) various types of outsourcing. This  evolution of research 
topics is mostly consistent with Gonzalez et al.’s (2006) observation, while the 
topics pertaining to ITO success complement this previous review and show the 
effort to address the related research gap identified by Dibbern et al. (2004) with 
the highest number of articles. Three interactive determinants categories are found 
to be significant to affect the success of ITO, respectively ITO decision, 
contractual governance and relational governance; in turn, ITO success also leads 
to enhanced ITO decisions and governance (Figure 6). It provides evidence for the 
strategic importance of governance for higher level of ITO success, as well as a 
rich illustration for the complex interactions among the decision, governance and 
success of ITO. Meanwhile, the topic of organizational capabilities, involving both 
client and supplier capabilities, also pertains to ITO success. Based on prior 
seminal works, the authors suggest a mix of complementary capabilities leading to 
success. In addition, the authors also argue that previous experience, as an 
important part of organizational capability, is the best leverage to mitigate ITO 
risks. This is to say, the learning curve effects are vital and cannot be bypassed. 
This resonates with Dibbern et al. (2004) that called for more research to trace 












organizations can be uncovered. However, despite Dibbern et al.’s (2004) forecast 
that the focus of ITO would shift to management intents, the authors assert that 
from practitioners’ perspective cost saving was still the most significant strategic 
intent of outsourcing, and the pursuit for strategic exploitation of ITO remained 
with lower priority. The authors also conclude with the persistent importance of 
ITO governance, which have been an issue challenging both practitioners and 
researchers for nearly 20 years. 
 
Figure 6 Interactions among ITO success and its determinants (Lacity et al., 
2009) 
Most recently, Lacity, Khan, Yan, and Willcocks (2010) reviewed 164 
empirical papers on ITO published during 1992-2010, extending the timeline of 
Dibbern et al.’s (2004) review for literally ten years. Based on the data, they 
developed two ITO models connecting the categories of pertinent independent and 
dependent variables out of literature: a model of ITO decisions, and another of ITO 
outcomes. These two interrelated models, as depicted in Figure 7, have concisely 
summarized two decades of ITO research. Both ITO decisions and outcomes 
involve various dependent variables. The three most frequently researched 
dependent variables on ITO decisions are respectively the decision of “make-or-
buy” (i.e. insource or outsource), the decision of outsourcing locations (i.e. 
offshore or onshore), and the decision of contract types. The category of ITO 
outcomes involve more dependent variables, but the most popular variables are 
relatively concentrated, including the client’s perception on ITO success both 
onshore and offshore, relationship quality, the performance of business, project 
and IS out of ITO, etc. The authors also show the evolution of both ITO decisions 








early ITO studies in the 1990s while the latter enjoys a trend of increased research 
attention since the millennium.  
 
Figure 7 Models of ITO decisions and outcomes (Lacity et al., 2010) 
Figure 7 has integrated the two models due to the over-lapping elements in both 
models, showing the major relationships between the broad categories of 
dependent and independent variables. The most important determinants of ITO 
decisions are categorized as motivation to outsource, influence sources, client firm 
characteristics, and transaction attributes, among which two categories (i.e. client 
firm characteristics and transactional attributes) also include independent variables 
for ITO outcomes. Moreover, one variable in the category of ITO decision (i.e. the 
“make-or-buy” decision) serves as another determinant for ITO outcome. 
Additionally, the categories of relational and contractual governance, client and 
supplier firm capabilities, and decision characteristics also involve pertinent 
independent variables for ITO outcomes. Looking back at the evolution of both 
models, these interrelations have provided evidence that studies on the 
increasingly more attractive topics of ITO outcome has well rooted in the early 
studies on ITO decision, while still expanding into new research territories by 
exploring new determinants and relationships. Besides relationships between 
dependent and independent variables, the authors also acknowledge the 
significance to examine interactions among different categories of independent 
variables. According to the authors’ analysis of literature, the two most important 
relations are identified as between ITO decision and contractual governance, and 
between contractual and relational governance. It is highlighted that superior ITO 
outcomes are observed when ITO decision is matched with appropriate contractual 












Supplier firm capabilities 
Client firm capabilities 
Decision characteristics 
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relational governance is complimentary rather than substitutive. Consistent with 
Lacity et al. (2009), the learning curve effects are also stressed here, with which 
the authors criticize Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) with limitations of 
overlooking the effect of past ITO experiences on the future ITO activities.  
As concluded in Lacity et al. (2010), the research gaps identified by Dibbern et 
al. (2004) have been well addressed by researchers during the decade after 
millennium. However, new challenges and research gaps also emerge over time. 
The authors call for more studies on several areas that lack research attention, 
including strategic ITO decisions and outcomes, interactions between ITO and 
firm capabilities, environment effects on ITO, the combination of multiple factors 
for ITO success, new offshoring destinations, and new models and emerging 
trends. Furthermore, theoretical development is underscored for future studies. On 
one hand, the prevailing application of theories from other disciplines (e.g. 
economic, strategic, and organizational theories) in the field of ITO can also 
inform and enrich the content of referenced theory; on the other hand, the field has 
been maturing to such a proper stage that indigenous theories of ITO, which are 
still lacking, need to be developed at a higher priority.  
 
2.2 ITO governance 
The conceptualization of ITO governance initially derives from the understandings 
of IT governance.  Weill’s (2004) definition of IT governance, “the framework for 
decision rights and accountabilities to encourage desirable behaviour in the use 
of IT” (p.3), has been widely adopted to define ITO governance as well. Actually, 
in early studies, ITO itself was regarded as a new option of IT governance, which 
externalizes the scope of governing IT from internal organization to external 
vendors on the market (Loh & Venkatraman, 1992). Such atomistic view focuses 
on different entities involved in the ITO relationship, and examines ITO 
governance from either client or vendor perspective (Gonzalez et al., 2006). The 
client perspective often focuses on the sourcing decisions; either on how to choose 
between two options of governing IT, i.e. insourcing or outsourcing, (Cronk & 
Sharp, 1995), or on the rationale of such decisions (Grover, Cheon, & Teng, 
1994a). Some advices to outsourcing clients also pertains to the strategy for 
successfully governed relationships (Lee, Miranda, & Kim, 2004). From the 
vendor’s perspective, studies are conducted on vendor’s competencies of 
governing IT which creates value for clients and also enables vendors to obtain 
economic benefits (e.g. Levina & Ross, 2003).   
Following the growing maturity and experience of ITO in practice, research on 
ITO governance has also developed with an expanded and more holistic view, 
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departing from the traditional atomistic view borrowed from IT governance. This 
is manifested in the evolving definition of ITO governance, which now focuses 
more on the relationship and alignment of all involved parties. For example, Oshri, 
Kotlarsky, and Willcocks (2015)  define the governance of outsourcing as “the 
processes and structures that ensure the alignment of the strategies and objectives 
of the parties involved” (p.239). Tracing the conceptualization and research 
progress on ITO governance, we have conducted a literature review (Lin & Vaia 
2015) which reveals two research strands on this topic: governance structure and 
governance mechanisms. 
2.2.1 Governance structure 
Mani, Barua, and Whinston’s (2010) define governance structure as “the 
ownership and control structure used to formalize the relationship, and distinguish 
among these structures by the level of hierarchical control, length, and extent of 
formalization” (p.44-45). This definition has well reflected the shift in ITO 
governance research to a holistic approach and relational focus. Corresponding to 
the theoretical foundations of ITO as a general topic, understandings on 
governance structure in particular are also strongly rooted from Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). This theoretical root is manifested in multiple synonyms for 
“governance structure”, e.g. “governance forms” and “governance modes”, which 
are originally conceptualized in classic TCE literature by Williamson (Williamson, 
1975, 1979, 1986, 1994).  
Prior literature has addressed three types of governance structure: market, 
hierarchy, and network. However, understandings and definitions on these three 
types vary among different scholars and research fields (Adler, 2001; Miranda & 
Kavan, 2005; Powell, 1990). In ITO research, the understanding on typologies of 
governance structure has also evolved over time. In early years, the choice between 
the “market or hierarchy” dichotomy is considered within the “make or buy” 
decision, on the basis of transactional properties including asset specificity, 
frequency and uncertainty. Typically, market governance is attributed to the option 
of “outsourcing” where the locus of governance extends to external organizations; 
whereas hierarchy governance is related to “insourcing” where the original 
hierarchy of IT governance is preserved (see e.g. Cronk & Sharp, 1995). Following 
TCE, scholars recognize that the option of market governance (i.e. outsourcing) 
will lower production cost but raise transaction cost; vice versa, opting for 
hierarchy governance (i.e. insourcing) will probably lower transaction cost but 
result in higher production cost (Alaghehband, Rivard, Wu, & Goyette, 2011; 
Cheon, Grover, & Teng, 1995; Wang, 2002; Watjatrakul, 2005). Meanwhile, 
governance structures of “market” or “hierarchy” has been discussed under other 
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theoretical context as well, such as Agency Cost Theory (ACT) and Resource-
Based Theory (RBT) (Cheon et al., 1995; Grover, Cheon, & Teng, 1994b); while 
incorporating alternative criteria, these studies also focus on the consistency of 
structural choices with “make or buy” decision. Although defining such pure 
structures of market and hierarchy is beneficial for theoretical development, it 
rarely exists in practice. Therefore, other scholars have criticized this dichotomous 
view by emphasizing the intertwined elements from both structures (De Looff, 
1995), and introducing a third option of “mixed-governance” between the two 
choices (Aubert, Houde, Patry, & Rivard, 2012). Despite having extended the 
dichotomous view of governance structure, these studies still perceive ITO as a 
particular governance structure of vertical disintegration, differing from the 
holistic view regarding ITO relationship as an entity.  
As outsourcing is increasingly becoming an indispensable option for firms to 
manage IT, both researchers’ and practitioners’ attention has shifted from the 
initial “make or buy” decision to the maintenance of successful ITO relationships. 
The holistic approach to study ITO has then emerged regarding all parties in ITO 
as part of an integrated entity, differing from the prior view of vertical 
disintegration with “internal vs. external” dichotomy. This approach is reflected 
by the introduction of “network governance” into ITO research as a new 
governance structure besides the dichotomy of “market” and “hierarchy”, 
incorporating all participant organizations into a holistic network. The new 
definitions of these three types of governance structure are succinctly synthesized 
by Miranda and Kavan (2005) particularly for the context of ITO:  “the market is 
an institutionally derived and transaction – or contract-based governance form; 
the hierarchy is an institutionally derived authority-based form; the network is a 
socially-derived informal form” (p.153). As manifested by this definition, the 
perspective on governance structure has transformed from either client or vendor’s 
view to the level of integrated ITO relationship. Moreover, all the three governance 
structures under the holistic view represent options for ITO, in contrast from the 
traditional view in which ITO itself is just one of the structural options of 
governance. Furthermore, appropriate fit is needed between ITO strategy and the 
type of governance structure. According to Lee et al. (2004), three gestalts of ITO 
strategy, i.e. arm’s length, independent, and embedded, respectively correspond to 
the market, hierarchy and network types of governance structure. It is also argued 
that as governance structure becomes more integrated from market to hierarchy, 
and finally to network, the relational strength in the ITO strategy will also 
correspondingly increase. In addition to ITO strategy, different types of 
governance structure can be adopted in different stages of outsourcing. In Miranda 
and Kavan’s (2005) Moments of Governance (MoG) model, market and hierarchy 
are inscribed into the alternative structures on the stage of promissory contract, 
when ITO decision process occurs; whereas hierarchy and network governance are 
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considered as viable options on the stage of  psychological contract, during the 
post-adoption maintenance of ITO relationship. 
2.2.2 Governance mechanisms 
While a certain governance structure defines the overall shape of ITO 
governance, here governance mechanisms are defined as a set of embodied “tools” 
to ensure the realization of governance (Lin & Vaia, 2015). Prior ITO literature 
has identified two inter-related categories of governance mechanisms, namely 
contractual governance and relational governance (Huber, Fischer, Dibbern, & 
Hirschheim, 2013; Lioliou, Zimmermann, Willcocks, & Gao, 2014; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002), which are both identified as important constructs categories in the 
theory building for ITO (Lacity, Willcocks, & Khan, 2011). Mainly three 
governance mechanisms have been discussed in the prior literature: contract (Y. 
Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009; Kim, Shin, & Lee, 2013; Koh et al., 2004; Mani, Barua, 
& Whinston, 2013), control (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003; Srivastava & Teo, 
2012), and the supporting Information System (IS) (Mani, Barua, & Whinston, 
2006). Based on a review of prior literature (Lin & Vaia, 2015), this study 
identifies the distinction between the categories of contractual and relational 
governance by the properties of these mechanisms (Table 2).  
Table 2 Contractual governance and relational governance 
Governance mechanisms Contractual Governance Relational Governance 
Contract Promissory contract Psychological contract 
Control Formal control Informal control 
Supporting IS Process-oriented design Agility-oriented design 
 
The properties of contract mechanism are differentiated as promissory and 
psychological contracts (Miranda & Kavan, 2005). Promissory contract refers to 
the formally specified legal contract with detailed stipulation on obligations of 
contractual parties (Rousseau & Parks, 1993). Prior ITO research on promissory 
contract has studied the choice of contractual structure and the consequence of 
such choices. The choice of contractual structure, either as fixed-price (FP) or on 
the basis of time and material (TM) (Gopal, Sivaramakrishnan, Krishnan, & 
Mukhopadhyay, 2003), will contextualize different effects of governance 
provisions, such as transaction characteristics (Y. Chen & Bharadwaj, 2009), 
business familiarity (Gefen et al., 2008), information structure (Mani, Barua, & 
Whinston, 2012), etc. Beyond the choice of an optimal contractual structure, 
different structures can also be combined to optimize their impact on ITO 
(Bhattacharya, Gupta, & Hasija, 2014). Meanwhile, the consequence of different 
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contractual choices needs to be evaluated. For example, the fluctuation of equity 
price can be used as an indicator of such consequence, as the rise or fall of share 
value is related with the fit of contract choices with the relationship property and 
outsourced tasks (Mani et al., 2013). Contrary to promissory contract, the terms 
and conditions on the mutual obligations in psychological contract is based on the 
psychological beliefs, rather than specified legal terms, of the exchange parties 
(Koh et al., 2004; Rousseau & Parks, 1993). First introduced by Koh et al. (2004) 
into ITO research, the notion of psychological contract has been used as an 
effective lens to study ITO relationships, as it focuses on people’s beliefs of 
obligation in their mutual exchange. On one hand, the psychological contract on 
individual level can impact the overall ITO success on the relationship level (Koh 
et al., 2004); on the other hand, the breach of psychological contract will in turn 
mediate the effect of promissory contract on the performance of governance (Kim 
et al., 2013). Actually, promissory contract and psychological contract are not 
isolated under different ITO contexts; instead, these two mechanisms can coexist 
with substitutive effect to each other (Lioliou et al., 2014).  
Besides contract, the control mechanisms are recognized as essential for ITO 
governance (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003). Two modes of controls, formal and 
informal, have been used to govern ITO in different contexts (Choudhury & 
Sabherwal, 2003; Lacity et al., 2011; Tiwana, 2010), which can be further 
categorized into four mechanisms: outcome control and behaviour control as two 
formal mechanisms, and self-control and clan control as two informal mechanisms 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003). During the course of software development 
outsourcing, outcome control prevails in the starting phase of projects, whereas the 
later stage is dominated by behaviour control. These two control mechanisms 
heavily rely on the formal promissory contract for specification and monitoring. A 
typical example of such formal mode of control mechanism is the “mechanistic 
governance” introduced by Srivastava and Teo (2012) in the context of offshore 
outsourcing. In this particular mechanism, both outcome and behaviour controls 
are realized through close reference to the formal contract, and no deviations are 
allowed “from the pre-specified outcomes and procedures” (p.118). While the 
effectiveness of this control mechanism is confirmed in the offshoring scenario, its 
effect is not elaborated in other contexts. Unlike formal control, informal control 
is realized through relational means rather than formal stipulation. However, the 
mode of informal control is also tightly connected to informal control. For 
instance, self-control can be mobilized through the effect of behaviour control 
(Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003). As to clan control, it is found to be harder to 
establish in ITO (Choudhury & Sabherwal, 2003), or even likely to cause reduced 
project efficiency in certain context of software development outsourcing (Gopal 
& Gosain, 2010). However, as an antecedent of clan control (Kirsch, Ko, & Haney, 
2009), the notion of trust has been recognized as important in ITO relationships. 
31 
Consensus can be observed that trust is the basis for informal control (Fink, 2010; 
Sabherwal, 1999; Tiwana, 2010); meanwhile, it is also argued that trust is a 
complementary mechanism to formal controls (Heiskanen, Newman, & Eklin, 
2008). In effect, contract-based formal controls and trust-based informal controls 
can simultaneously complement and substitute to each other, thus are compatible 
to coexist (Tiwana, 2010). The positive influence of informal controls in general 
has been confirmed to enforce the relationship quality (Fink, 2010); though some 
contradicting findings are also observed (Gopal & Gosain, 2010), which calls for 
deeper understandings on the informal control mechanisms. On the 
implementation of informal controls, Chua, Lim, Soh, & Sia (2012) explored the 
enactment of clan control. Although their study is based on complex IT projects, 
the findings can also imply to different situations in ITO contexts. 
Besides contract and control, the governance mechanism, in form of an effective 
supporting IS, is often overlooked in the prior literature. Such IS is another 
essential “tool” to embody and realize ITO governance, especially for the 
coordination among different parties. As today’s ITO relationships often involve 
firms with geographically dispersed teams, the level of information exchange for 
governance will be significantly affected by the supporting system. Thus we 
perceive it as another type of governance mechanisms, together with contract and 
control mechanisms (see Table 2). For effective governance, the system design 
needs to be in line with other governance mechanisms, i.e. type of contract and the 
depth of relational influence in control  (Mani et al., 2006). For instance, to govern 
ITO relationships with formal mechanisms of contract and control, the system 
design tends to be process-oriented, relying on a series of strict work processes 
defined by the corresponding contract; in contrary, with the demand of intensive 
interaction in relationships featuring psychological contract and informal control, 
the system will be desired more as agility-oriented, with heavy reliance on 
informal communication and collaboration channels.  
Table 2 shows the configurations of different properties in contract, control and 
supporting IS into the categories of contractual and relational governance, which 
are both recognized as important constructs for building an endogenous ITO theory 
(Lacity et al., 2011). However, this categorization of governance mechanisms 
defines only the ideal situation with extreme configurations, where contractual 
governance involve only formal mechanisms and relational governance is purely 
realized through informal mechanisms. In effect, the boundary between 
contractual and relational governance is not a straightforward line but rather 
blurred; meanwhile, their interrelations are salient, manifested by scholars’ debates 
on the complementarity and/or substitution between these two categories (Goo, 
Kishore, Rao, & Nam, 2009; Huber et al., 2013; Lioliou et al., 2014; Poppo & 
Zenger, 2002). For instance, already in an early study of ITO research, Clark, 
Zmud, and McCray (1995) noted that “Those happiest with their current 
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outsourcing arrangements were those with a limited set of tightly defined 
contractual elements with a larger portion of the relationship handled through 
joint agreements consisting of broader performance objectives and appropriate 
governance mechanisms” (p.233). This quote illustrates the co-existence of both 
contractual and relational governance in practice. On one hand, in this particular 
configuration, tightly defined contractual terms, together with formal document-
based controls, do exist, though they are used to a limited extent; on the other hand, 
psychological contract and informal control mechanisms are emphasized in “a 
larger portion of the relationship”, yet still not for the entire relationship. For the 
sake of theoretical distinction and parsimony, we still keep the two ideal 
extremities in Table 2, but use dotted line between contractual and relational 
governance. 
2.2.3 Aligning governance mechanisms with governance structure 
As discussed in sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, governance structure is the framework 
shaping the ITO governance, differentiated as market, hierarchy and network; 
whereas governance mechanisms refer to the embodied means through which 
governance is realized, including contract, control and the supporting IS. Indeed, 
the structure and mechanisms, though studied mostly in separation in prior 
literature, are complementary aspects of governance. Therefore, an integrated 
framework is needed involving both aspects for a comprehensive understanding of 
ITO governance.  
In their MoG model, Miranda and Kavan (2005) proposed to circumscribe 
different governance forms1 into two stages of contract mechanisms: promissory 
contract and psychological contract. They argue that promissory contract can be 
adopted under market and/or hierarchy governance for arm’s length relationships; 
while only hierarchy and network governance can accommodate psychological 
contract for embedded relationships. The MoG model offers the starting point for 
my study by aligning contrasting characteristics of contract mechanism with 
different governance structures. As mentioned in the last section, governance 
mechanisms involve controls and the supporting IS as well, which also need to be 
mapped into different structures.  
The mechanism of control is tightly related with contract. On one hand, contract 
stipulates the rules and benchmarks to be followed during the governance, either 
in form of formal documents, or within the psychological beliefs of participants; 
on the other hand, control, by means of formal or informal mechanisms, embodies 
the practices to ensure the execution of contract. Formal controls, including 
                                                 
1 In this study, my understanding of governance structure is in line with Miranda and Kevan’s (2005) 
definition of governance forms, including market, hierarchy and network. 
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behaviour control and outcome control, are indeed carried out on the basis of rules 
and benchmarks stipulated “on paper”. Similar to the mechanism of promissory 
contract, formal controls also characterize the market structure of governance, 
where control is externalized and based on promissory contract. As an authority-
based structure, hierarchy governance can emerge at both moments of promissory 
contract and psychological contract (Miranda & Kavan, 2005). Similarly, in 
hierarchy structure, control is internalized, to a certain extent, by promoting more 
extended participation compared to the market structure, thus facilitating the 
informal forms of self-control and clan control; whereas the formal controls for 
outcome and behaviour are still present in the established hierarchy, which are still 
stipulated by formal contract. Therefore, hierarchy structure embraces both formal 
and informal controls. The network structure, by definition, is constructed upon 
extensive social interactions and trust-based relations (Adler, 2001). It is the most 
integrative structure among all the parties, in which governance is enacted through 
psychological contract, and controls are dominated by informal mechanisms (i.e. 
self-control and clan control). As to the supporting IS, its alignment with other 
governance mechanisms has been discussed in the section 2.2.2. Thus following 
the corresponding contract and control mechanisms, the systems with process-
oriented design can support market structure, while those with agility-oriented 
design are more suitable for network structure. Again, in hierarchy structure, both 
designs can be optional candidates of the supporting IS, and the final selection 
would depend on the context of each case.  
In summary, Table 3 shows the alignment of governance mechanisms and 
governance structure by mapping different mechanisms of contractual and 
relational governance under the three types of governance structure. Consistent 
with Table 2, the dotted line is used here to avoid absolute separation between the 
two categories of governance mechanisms; furthermore, the arrows under the three 
types of structures re-emphasize the alignment of different mechanisms as a 
continuum from market, to hierarchy and eventually to network. Naturally, in 
practice, different governance structures may overlap with each other; more often 
than not, the portfolio of different mechanisms in both contractual and relational 
governance will be mixed under a certain governance structure. Here it is worth 
noticing that this study will only focus on the latter two governance structures, i.e. 
hierarchy and network. Because in the chosen research setting of post-adoption 




Table 3 Aligning governance mechanisms and governance structure 
 Governance structure 
Market Hierarchy Network 
Governance 
mechanisms 
Contractual Governance Relational Governance 
Contract Promissory contract Psychological contract 
Control Formal control Informal control 
Supporting IS Process-oriented design Agility-oriented design 
 
2.3 The governance of IT multi-sourcing 
In recent years’ ITO practice, multi-sourcing, defined as a type of outsourcing 
practices “stitching together best-of-breed IT services” from multiple vendors 
(Bapna, Barua, Mani, & Mehra, 2010, p.785), has become a significant pushing 
force for the future growth of global ITO (ISG, 2014; Oshri et al., 2015). This 
definition implies several key characteristics of multi-sourcing. First, unlike the 
traditional dyadic client-vendor relationship in ITO, the multi-sourcing 
relationship is “one-to-many”, typically involving a single client and multiple 
vendors (Dibbern et al., 2004; Plugge & Janssen, 2014). Second, these vendors 
need to collaborate in the outsourced tasks, which can then be “stitched together” 
by the client. Hence in multi-sourcing, compared to dyadic outsourcing, additional 
capabilities are not only needed from the vendors on collaborating with each other, 
but also from the client who must be able to manage and integrate the delivered 
services from different vendors (Bapna et al., 2010; Lempinen & Rajala, 2014; 
Oshri et al., 2015). Last but not least, the objective of multi-sourcing is to obtain 
an integrated “best-of-breed IT services” with increased benefits for the client 
compared to dyadic ITO, such as higher quality and less risks (Currie, 1998; 
Levina & Su, 2008).  
Despite the recognized importance of multi-sourcing both in research and in 
practice, our understanding on this novel phenomenon is still limited (Wiener & 
Saunders, 2014), since most of theoretical insights on ITO derive from dyadic 
client-vendor relationships. As implied by the definition, besides the perceived 
benefits, new challenges are also posed to scholars and practitioners on multi-
sourcing due to the new features of multi-sourcing. On one hand, complexity arise 
from the increased number of parties in the relationship (Fridgen & Mueller, 2011; 
Levina & Su, 2008) which might raise management cost as well as demand higher 
management capability from the client. On the other hand, in addition to client-
vendor relationships, vendor-vendor relationship also becomes salient as different 
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vendors have to collaborate despite being competitors, in order to achieve the 
client’s business goal. Corresponding to such research opportunities, different 
aspects of multi-sourcing have been addressed in recent studies, such as the 
rationale behind the choice for multi-sourcing (Bapna et al., 2013), decision on 
vendor portfolio (Fridgen & Mueller, 2011), vendor-vendor knowledge transfer 
(Schott, 2011), mindful management practices (Beck et al., 2011), and so on. In 
this study, I focus on the governance aspect of multi-sourcing to address the 
challenges faced by both client and vendor. In the next sub-sections, different 
multi-sourcing models are reviewed from prior literature, in order to contextualize 
ITO governance into the multi-sourcing scenario.  
2.3.1 Multi-sourcing models 
Prior literature has provided rich examples of various multi-sourcing deals in 
practice, among which two basic models of vendor structures are identified: (1) 
direct model and (2) mediated model (Wiener & Saunders, 2014).  
Direct model refers to the multi-sourcing arrangements in which the client 
directly interacts with each vendor. The widely recognized ITO landmark deal, 
between Kodak and its three vendors in 1989 (Applegate & Montealegre, 1991), 
applies such direct model. In this influential outsourcing decision, Kodak 
outsourced the data centre operations to IBM, telecommunications and network 
services to DEC, and the personal computer support to Business Land. As shown 
in Figure 8, the vendors are dedicated to separate responsible areas in this multi-
sourcing structure, managed directly by the client. As little task overlapping is in 
place, and the interdependency among vendors are low, I characterize such vendor 
structure as multi-vendor outsourcing, which differs from dyadic outsourcing 
relationships simply by the increased number of direct vendors. 
 













Some scholars argue that a differentiating feature of multi-sourcing is the high 
interdependency among vendor tasks (Bapna et al., 2010; Oshri et al., 2015); thus 
for them, conventional multi-vendor outsourcing, such as the Kodak case, cannot 
be qualified as multi-sourcing. In this sense, the outsourcing approach of British 
Petroleum (BP) in 1993 is featured with high vendor interdependencies and direct 
client-vendor interface, hence can appropriately exemplify the direct model of 
multi-sourcing. Similar to Kodak case, BP also involved three different vendors: 
Sema Group, Synchordia, and SAIC; but instead of assigning disparate tasks to 
them, they require all the vendors to work together towards integrated IT services, 
and to deliver the combined tasks seamlessly. The cornerstone of this strategy is 
underlined as “multiple IT suppliers that act as one” (Cross, 1995, p.95), in which 
the client manage multiple vendors directly, yet receive integrated services from a 
combined interface depending on the responsible areas of each vendor (Figure 9).  
For instance, if an incident occurs in the area of IT facilities which belongs to 
SAIC’s responsibility, even if the problem actually lies in Synchordia’s network 
infrastructure or Sema Group’s data centre, SAIC is expected to coordinate the 
work and be the single point of contact in charge of the final solution. If attention 
is needed in the area of data centres, Sema Group will become the main contact 
instead; same applies to Synchordia in the area of network infrastructure. Due to 
the task interdependency and required single interface, in this case, vendors have 
to collaborate closely together and cannot pass responsibilities to each other; 
however, there is no single vendor that is appointed as the “guardian”, and the 
client, in effect, still manages the vendors directly despite the integrated interface. 
This structure is similar to the “direct-overlapping” model identified by Wiener 
and Saunders (2014), where the vendors have overlapped responsibilities and are 
forced to cooperate with each other. 
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Mediated model is also often referred to as “guardian vendor model” (e.g. 
Bapna et al., 2010). As suggested by the name, this model relies on an intermediate 
party, usually one of the vendors, to coordinate other vendors on behalf of the 
client. In the context of offshoring, Olsson, Conchúir, Ågerfalk, and Fitzgerald 
(2008) has introduced a two-stage offshoring model adopted by multinational 
companies, with their Irish captive sites as mediating “bridges” between the US 
headquarter and the far-shore captive unit in India. One of the cases in their study, 
the Pennysoft case, is illustrated in Figure 10, in which different tasks are assigned 
in different sites of the same multinational company. Due to the favourable 
temporal location, the Irish site becomes the bridge in this two-stage model of 
offshoring, who then experiences both perspectives of client and vendor in this 
offshoring relationship. Similarly, Mahnke, Wareham, and Bjorn-Anderson (2008) 
also studied the intermediary capabilities of such offshore middlemen, which 
bridges the cultural and cognitive distances, and render supports in both pre-
contractual preparation and post-contractual operations. Although these studies 
focus on offshoring rather than multi-sourcing, they have generated valuable 
understandings on the basic mechanism of mediating and the role of guardian 
vendor for our mediated model of multi-sourcing. 
 
Figure 10 Two-stage offshoring: The Pennysoft case (Olsson et al., 2008) 
Shell’s multi-sourcing decision on its IT infrastructure (Chapman, 2008) is a 
typical example of mediated model adopted in a multi-sourcing scenario. As 
shown in Figure 11, complementary parts of infrastructure services were provided 
by three different vendors: network and telecommunication by AT&T, hosting and 
storage by T-Systems, and end-user computing by Electronic Data Systems (EDS). 
In addition to its dedicated area of end-user services, EDS is also selected as the 
guardian vendor to integrate the infrastructure services provided by all the vendors. 
Therefore, in this case, the responsibilities of EDS are similar to those of the 
captive Irish site in the Pennysoft case. On one hand, both the Irish site and EDS 
have their own operational tasks assigned by the headquarter/the client; on the 
other hand, both of them also take over the coordination work with other vendor(s) 
















vendor in Shell’s arrangement is pre-assigned instead of task-based; thus Shell can 
rely on EDS as a “real” single point of contact for any responsible areas in the 
scope of all the outsourced vendor tasks. 
 
 
Figure 11 Guardian vendor multi-sourcing: The Shell case (Chapman, 2008) 
Another example of the mediated model is the South Australian Water (SA 
Water) case presented by Thorogood, Yetton, Vlasic, and Spiller (2004) (Figure 
12).  In contrast to Shell’s strategy of outsourcing the entire IT infrastructure, SA 
Water adopted selective outsourcing, in which they only sought for IT skills and 
advices from external vendors, while still keep business related tasks such as IT 
risk management to the IS department in house. To manage such complex scenario 
involving multiple parties both internal and external, they opted for a strategic 
broker model. In this model, the CIO is positioned as broker of IT services pooling 
talents and task focuses from all available resources. Meanwhile, the organization 
of Corporate Information System is also shifted from centralised to role-based; 
multiple organisational styles of different parties are integrated to carry out 
complementary IS tasks in synergy. In this case, the CIO takes over the mediating 
role to manage the portfolio of role-based tasks from both internal IS department 
and external service vendors. Differing from the Shell case, here the “guardian 
vendor” is an individual, the CIO, who is employed by the client firm; moreover, 
the service providers are not only external vendors but also internal staff to the 
client. Some scholars have defined such sourcing mode as plural sourcing 













2013), where firm both “make” and “buy” service. However, as by definition, 
multi-sourcing acquires IT services from multiple interdependent parties; this form 
of sourcing can also fall into the realm of multi-sourcing, and render insights for 
multi-sourcing research. Furthermore, the CIO in this case can indeed be perceived 
as the guardian vendor, considering his mediating role and responsibilities on 
alignment. Therefore, the broker model of SA Water case can be seen as a special 
instance of mediated model multi-sourcing. 
 
Figure 12 Broker model of selective outsourcing: The SA Water case 
(Thorogood et al., 2004) 
2.3.2 ITO governance in the context of multi-sourcing 
As emphasized in Bapna et al.’s (2010) call for multi-sourcing research, tight 
interdependencies among multiple parties entails updated understandings on the 
governance of such relationships. Although the holistic approach, which involves 
both client and vendor as an integrated ITO organization, has been effective in 
studies of dyadic ITO governance structure (see section 2.1.1), it cannot be directly 
applied to the context of multi-sourcing, as nuances and complexities of 
governance will emerge with the increased number of vendors. Thus we have to 
re-introduce the atomistic view to be combined with the holistic approach when 
assessing governance structure; in other words, each firm’s structural 
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ITO relationship as an entity (Lin & Hekkala, 2014).  A similar view is shared by 
Mugurusi and De Boer (2013) who studied governance in dispersed offshore 
production. They assert that both intra-firm relationships and the overall 
governance structure need to be developed hand-in-hand, in order to succeed in 
each plant’s operation while maintaining the coherence of the whole production 
network.  
More often than not, the histories of relationship establishment are different 
between the client and each vendor. Before the start of a multi-sourcing 
arrangement when additional vendors are introduced into the relationship, the 
client might have already experienced some prior outsourcing contracts with some 
of the vendors. Thus, the mutuality and trust between the client and each vendor 
can vary significantly, resulting in the discrepancy of governance mechanisms 
between the client and different vendors. Moreover, the difference in the supply 
base depth (Su & Levina, 2011), i.e. “[client] firm’s level of investment in a 
particular supply relationship for a given function” (p.719), also affects the 
client’s adoption of governance mechanisms with each vendor. In addition to the 
governance mechanisms between client and each vendor, we also need to pay 
attention to the mechanisms regulating vendor-vendor relationships, which may 
exhibit differently in the two multi-sourcing models, i.e. mediated or direct. 
Confirming the complexity deriving from interdependencies among multi-
sourcing parties, Plugge and Janssen (2014) proposed the implementation of clear 
governance agreements including both contractual and relational elements to 
facilitate cooperative relationships. However, cooperation is not the only feature 
of multi-sourcing relationships. Wiener and Saunders (2014) described the vendor-
vendor relationships as “forced coopetition”, which contain both competition and 
cooperation forced by the client. Therefore, governance mechanisms in multi-
sourcing will probably engage a mix of contractual and relational elements, which 
are contextualized not only by client-vendor relationships, but also by vendor-
vendor relationships. 
As discussed above, both the structure and mechanisms of ITO governance 
would be more complex in the context of multi-sourcing due to the increased 
number of vendors. Indeed, the situation of governance also varies in different 
multi-sourcing models. As elaborated in section 2.3.1, considering vendor task 
interdependency as the qualifying prerequisite of multi-sourcing (Bapna et al., 
2010; Oshri et al., 2015), the BP case (Figure 9) and the Shell case (Figure 11) are 
most representative of the direct model and the mediated model of multi-sourcing. 
Since the Kodak case (Figure 8) involves mainly disparate vendor tasks, it is rather 
a simple compilation of several dyadic relationships than multi-sourcing in the 
strict sense.  Therefore, the governance of such scenario can refer to the knowledge 
of ITO governance in general (see section 2.1). Due to the scarcity of prior 
literature on multi-sourcing governance and the interpretive nature of this study 
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(See Chapter 3), I will not propose hypotheses on the governance structure and 
governance mechanisms for each multi-sourcing model at this point. In this study, 
Table 4 is used as a general framework to guide my empirical work, focusing on 
different relationships to be explored. In the mediated model, governance structure 
is constructed with two sub-structures: between the client and vendor 1, and 
between vendor 1 and other vendors. In addition, the compatibility of the chosen 
multi-sourcing governance structure will also depend on the features of internal 
structure within each party (Lin & Hekkala, 2014; Mugurusi & De Boer, 2013). 
Similarly, the governance mechanisms in the mediated model can also differentiate 
between those adopted by client with vendor 1, and by vendor 1 with other 
vendors. In the direct model, governance structure is composed of the sub-
structures between the client and all directly managed vendors, and among the 
interdependent vendors. As to governance mechanism in this model, the client’s 
relationship with each of the vendor needs to be considered based on its history 
and depth. For instance, if the client has had a long term relationship with vendor 
1, but has never worked with vendor 2 and vendor 3 before, the client would 
probably opt for very different governance mechanisms with vendor 1 and with 
the other two vendors. 
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2.4 Positioning this research 
Prior ITO literature has provided rich knowledge base for my study. The literature 
reviews presented in section 2.1 delineate a landscape of ITO research stream, 
allowing me to position and confirm the potential value of my own research. In the 
scope of Dibbern et al.’s (2004) stage model of ITO (Figure 3), I can position my 
research on the “how” stage within the implementation phase. On one hand, my 
research interest lies on the post-adoption stage of ITO, involving both the 
establishment and maintenance of ITO relationships. On the other hand, the 
empirical setting I have chosen also allows me to explore real-life emergence 
surrounding different relationships in a multi-sourcing context. Although the topic 
of vendor selection was not primarily intended in this research, implications related 
to structuring multiple vendor positions actually emerged during my inquiry on 
relationship issues. Therefore, my findings will cover all sub-stages within the 
“How” stage of the ITO lifecycle. In addition to the interactions of these sub-stages 
identified by prior literature (Dibbern et al., 2004), the emerging feedback loop 
observed in my empirical inquiry, informing the vendor selection from experience 
out of multi-sourcing governance, will contribute new insights to the 
understanding of ITO (Figure 13). This learning curve effect corresponds to the 
observation of Lacity et al. (2010) on prior literature that highlighted the match of 
ITO decision with appropriate governance of relationships for superior ITO 
outcomes; it also shades lights on how vendor selection can be appropriately 
adjusted with learnings from governance practices. 
 









Interaction identified by prior literature 
Additional interaction to be discussed in this research 
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3 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the methodology of this study. It is started with the choice of 
philosophical perspectives and the methodology of case study, which is then 
followed by an elaboration of the mixed method approach. The last section 
summarizes the implementation of methods in the embodied empirical work. 
3.1 Philosophical perspective 
Before introducing the methodology itself, it is worth elaborating the underlying 
philosophical assumptions as the foundation of my methodological choices. 
Following Avison and Fitzgerald (1995), here “philosophy” is regarded as a set of 
principles underlying the methodology. Although not all researchers tend to state 
their philosophical perspectives explicitly in business research in general (Eriksson 
& Kovalainen, 2008), and in IS research in particular (Sarker, Xiao, & Beaulieu, 
2013), I believe it is still important to explicate as it underscores every other 
methodological aspect and is not necessarily self-evident for all readers.  
Philosophical perspective, as discussed here, is often mentioned in IS research 
in different ways, such as “research paradigm”, “philosophical stance”, 
“underlying assumption”, and so on. Here I do not intend to assert the particularity 
of “philosophical perspective” as a distinct concept, but emphasizing its role for 
my study as an alternative philosophical choice, rather than a strong stance or a 
competing paradigm in a philosophical debate. Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggested 
three underlying beliefs delineating different “paradigms”: ontology, 
epistemology and methodology, which are then widely adopted in business 
research (e.g. W. Chen & Hirschheim, 2004; Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). 
Ontology concerns the nature of physical and social phenomena, and the 
relationship between their existence and human action. It aims to answer “What is 
there in the world?” (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, p.13); in other words, it 
pertains to whether “reality” is objectively given and independent of human action, 
or subjective and socially constructed (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Orlikowski 
& Baroudi, 1991). Both epistemology and methodology relate to the assumptions 
about knowledge. Epistemology concerns two basic questions: “(1) what is 
knowledge, and (2) how do we obtain ‘valid’ knowledge.” (Hirschheim, 1992, 
p.29); thus it concerns the essence, construction, and evaluation of knowledge. 
Methodology is tightly connected to epistemology, yet more practical; it is about 
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methods and techniques that are appropriate for collecting empirical evidence 
(Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). As assumptions about knowledge are inseparable 
from worldviews, the three basic beliefs of ontology, epistemology and 
methodology are closely related, and need to be coherent during any research 
approach (Sarker et al., 2013).  
Following Myers (2013), here I will focus on those philosophical assumptions 
especially related to epistemology, which is perceived as most pertinent to guide 
the research. In IS research, epistemology is commonly classified as positivist, 
interpretive and critical (Myers & Avison, 2002; Orlikowski & Baroudi, 1991). 
Table 5 presents each category of epistemology together with its related ontology, 
and methodology to achieve the “internal coherence” suggested by Sarker et al. 
(2013, p.xii). It is worth noticing that although these archetypical categories are 
distinct in philosophy, the boundaries between them are not always definitive in 
practice. For example, Ravishankar, Pan, & Leidner (2011) adopted “soft 
positivism” in their case study on subcultures, combining both positivist and 
interpretive approaches in data collection and analysis.  
Table 5 Philosophical perspectives and basic assumptions 
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In this research, the interpretive epistemology is adopted to guide the research 
approach, because my primary purpose of this study is to generate contextualized 
understandings through interpretations and sense-making together with my 
research participants. As discussed in Chapter 2, the phenomenon of ITO 
governance is complex in itself with intertwined conceptualizations. Moreover, to 
contextualize this phenomenon into multi-sourcing arrangements, such complexity 
will be further aggravated. Thus the subject matter under investigation, i.e. 
governance of IT multi-sourcing, is difficult to be attached with objective truth 
independent from the involvement of various human actors. Meanwhile, due to the 
highly contextualized nature of governance, it is also difficult to generate precise 
prediction detached from the context; even if such prediction would be possible, 
its value would still be questionable. Hence, positivist epistemology, together with 
its corresponding ontological stance and methodological choices (See Table 5), is 
not best applicable to my study. Although interpretive and critical research share 
much similarities in epistemology and methodology, I decided to follow 
interpretive perspective over critical stance, because my purpose focuses on 
“human interpretations and meanings” (Walsham, 1995, p.74) rather than critique 
of the social phenomenon with a strong value position in the light of a critical 
social theory (See Myers & Klein, 2011).  
Coherent with the interpretive perspective, my empirical work has been carried 
out as an iterative process in constant dialogue with the literature. In other words, 
the review of literature is not aiming to pre-define hypotheses or research 
frameworks to guide the empirical study, but rather conducted in parallel. For the 
same reason, the research question was not definitively pre-formulated; instead, 
only a general topic of interest, i.e. on governance of multi-sourcing relationships, 
was sketched before my entrance of field work. Therefore, the process of data 
collection and analysis are not only aimed to gather source of evidence, but also 
an essential link in the dialogic iteration between data and theoretical 
understanding to polish the research question (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). 
During this process, the purposefulness and relevance of literature search increases 
together with emerging understandings out of empirical data. This iterative process 
of research is shown in Figure 14. Within the scope of this iterative process, the 




Figure 14 Iterative research process (Adapted from Eriksson & Kovalainen, 
2008) 
3.2 Case study methodology 
3.2.1 Rationale for case study 
To study the phenomenon of multi-sourcing governance, which is both diverse and 
complex in organization settings, the chosen methodology needs to facilitate in-
depth learnings, avoid over-simplistic and overly-controlled designs, and hence 
generate holistic knowledge. This purpose entails rich empirical evidence from 
real-life business context. Moreover, my research question pertains to “how” the 
multi-sourcing of IT is governed. To fit the requirement of contextualization as 
well as my research question, case study is selected as the methodology of my 
empirical work (Yin, 2014).  
In the latest edition of his widely cited book on case study, Yin (2014) offered 
a two-fold definition of case study. On one hand, he specified the scope of case 
study as an in-depth investigation on a contemporary phenomenon which is not 
studied in separation from its real-life context. As an indispensable part of the case, 
context is tightly connected with the studied phenomenon. This also implies that 
the researcher has little control over emerging situations during the case study, 
contrasting from other methodologies such as surveys and laboratory experiments 
where contexts are clearly separated from the studied object. On the other hand, 
Yin also designated the data collection and analysis techniques in this definition, 
recommending multiple sources of evidence, triangulation, and theoretical 
propositions/hypotheses to guide the empirical work. While the former part of this 
definition, concerning contextualization, can also fit in interpretive research, the 
latter part on techniques implies a positivist stance which can represent only one 
particular type of case study. Actually, case study itself is not bound to any 
particular philosophical perspective; for example, in the field of IS, scholars have 
discussed the conduct of case studies under each perspective of positivist 
(Benbasat, 1987), interpretive (Walsham, 1995) and critical (Myers & Klein, 
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2011). Consistent with my chosen philosophical perspective, my case study is also 
interpretive in nature, aiming to “understand phenomena through the meanings 
that people assign to them” (Myers, 2013, p.80). Thus ex ante 
propositions/hypotheses are not conceived before the empirical work; instead, I 
focus on the emerging social construction throughout the course of the case study, 
i.e. how people perceive the world and why, and use theoretical understandings 
from the literature as “part of an iterative process of data collection and analysis” 
(Walsham, 1995, p.76).   
As suggested by Myers (2013), case study can be applicable at any research 
stage on a certain topic. Applied in the exploratory phase of a research topic, case 
study helps to discover new knowledge and build new theory (i.e. exploratory case 
study); whereas in the maturing phase of a subject, case study can also be used for 
testing and comparing theories, as well as developing causal explanations (i.e. 
explanatory case study). In my case, although the general topic of ITO governance 
has accumulated a considerable body of literature, knowledge of this topic is still 
scarce in the new context of multi-sourcing (see Chapter 2). According to Bapna 
et al. (2010), our prior understandings on dyadic ITO may not be applicable in 
multi-sourcing from many aspects, including governance. Therefore, my study is 
exploratory in nature, striving to generate new theoretical understandings on an 
established topic in a novel context. 
Case study can also be distinguished as intensive or extensive (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008), according to the aim, design, role of theory, selection of cases, 
and the way of generalization (See Table 6). Considering my philosophical 
perspective and the nature of research topic, I choose to follow the design of 
intensive case study, with in-depth investigation in a single case. Although such 
distinctions are not always a clear-cut in practice, intensive case study is more 
suitable with interpretive perspective, as it emphasizes interpretation and meanings 
in a given context. Referred back to the exploratory nature of my research, the 
iterative research design is more suitable for the researcher to grasp emerging 
meanings from an insider’s view. Such iterative process is featured with the 
continuous interplay between theory and empirical data (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). Although the case is considered as more centric in 
intensive case studies, it does not exclude the importance of theory; as the 
interpretations are informed by theory, and the thick descriptions of case can also 
elaborate theoretical understandings. The type of theory generated or elaborated in 
this case is for understanding (Gregor, 2006) rather than prediction and analytical 
generalization. Here theoretical generalization is realized in a naturalistic way by 
generating common understanding together with the reader. 
48 
Table 6 Intensive and extensive case study (Adapted from Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008) 
 Intensive case study Extensive case study 
Aim Understanding one (or a few) 
unique case(s) in specific 
contexts from inside. 




Iterative designs over time, 
detailed investigation 
Predefined and systematic 
research design, replicated in 
each case 
The role of 
theory 
Not central (case itself is central)  
- In dialogue with empirical 
data 
Central  




Unique, critical, or extreme 
- Finding a lot from a few 
Replication logic; the number of 
cases is decided by theoretical 
saturation 
- Mapping commonalities from 
a lot 
The way of 
Generalization 
Naturalistic generalization 
- Generating common 
understanding together with 
the reader, through a thick, 
holistic and contextualized 
description 
Analytic generalization:  
- Mapping common patterns 




About empirical material for case study, Walsham (1995) argues for interviews 
as the primary data source. Similarly, Myers (2013) also claim that empirical data, 
even in in-depth case studies, mostly derive from interviews and documents, 
particularly in business research. Others maintain that multiple sources of evidence 
can be selected with hardly any limitation, depending on the research question (e.g. 
Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Yin, 2014). Here I subscribe to the latter view, that 
case study as a methodology is not only philosophically neutral, but also not bound 
to specific empirical data, i.e. either qualitative or quantitative (Eriksson & 
Kovalainen, 2008); as long as the boundary of the case is clearly defined, the 
plurality of data source will increase the diversity and richness of the case, hence 
improve the study to be more accurate and convincing. In fact, case study breaks 
through the qualitative-quantitative divide, and offers various possibilities to 
combine qualitative and quantitative data.  
3.2.2 Case description 
My empirical work is conducted as an intensive case study, which investigates a 
multi-sourcing relationship, involving one client (CL) and its two suppliers (SP1 
and SP2), for the maintenance of IT infrastructure. As follows, I will introduce the 
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profile of each company, as well as a brief history of the multi-sourcing 
relationship. 
 
Figure 15 Task allocation between two suppliers 
CL is a Nordic-based insurance company operating in the Nordic and Baltic 
countries as well as in Russia. In 2012 when I carried out my empirical work, CL 
had approximately 7000 employees, serving 3.1 million customers. As modern 
insurance business demands highly stable IT infrastructure for smooth transactions 
in sales, claims, call centres, etc., CL decided to outsource the IT infrastructure 
maintenance work to the best-of-breed suppliers. One of the chosen suppliers is 
SP1, a leading international company in the area of IT services, with about 18000 
employees worldwide according to the company information in 2012. The initial 
outsourcing relationship began in 2005, when CL signed the first five-year contract 
with SP1 for all the delivery and development services on IT infrastructure, 
including hardware usages such as server and storage, services for the mainframes 
in the legacy systems, end-user services such as workstation supply and 
maintenance, and other ad-hoc IT projects based on demand. In 2010, CL decided 
to renew the outsourcing contract with SP1 for another five years, on condition 
that SP1 had to subcontract the end-user services (except the service desk) to a 
second supplier SP2, which is designated by CL but supposed to be managed by 
SP1. Compared to SP1, SP2 is smaller in form of scale (with about 6500 employees 
in 2012), and operating regions (SP1 is an international company whereas SP2 
only operates in Nordic and Baltic regions). However, SP2 had been fast-growing 
through mergers and acquisitions of small companies. Actually, SP2’s relationship 
with CL started as early as 2006, since they became the main computer hardware 
provider for CL, but their involvement in the infrastructure services only began 
with the new sourcing arrangement in 2010. The rationale for CL to demand such 
change was the appreciation of SP2’s expertise in the specific end-user area, as 













sourcing relationship in order to obtain better quality/price ratio on the outsourced 
services. The task allocation under the new sourcing structure is illustrated in 
Figure 15. My data collection involves 61 employees in CL’s department of IT 
services, a team of 24 people in SP1 who worked exclusively for CL, and five 
people from SP2 who also exclusively devoted to the service for CL. 
In addition to the background information of all the participating companies, 
here it is worth clarifying my role in this case study, my relationship with the 
participants, and how I gained access to the case materials. I was a full-time 
employee by CL before I started to pursue this doctoral study. However, this 
previous work focused on the area of IT reporting, which was not directly related 
to sourcing issues; my intention to start the doctoral study was also a personal 
decision, and not motivated by my former employer’s business needs. The case 
study was initiated about one year after the starting point of my doctoral study. At 
that time, I have reviewed pertinent literature on the general topic of IT 
outsourcing, and was looking for data collection opportunities for my empirical 
work. During a company visit to CL in a course for my master students, I took the 
opportunity to discuss about my research interest with a former colleague in CL, 
who was in charge of the IT infrastructure services. She was interested in my 
research topic, and introduced the situation and issues they were faced with in the 
area of outsourcing governance. Out of the mutual interest of each other’s work, 
we initiated this case study together, in which I was granted access to all the three 
participating organizations, as an external observer of their Governance Project 
within the IT Stability and Agility Program. The general goal of the Governance 
Project is to have an effective governance model for all current suppliers and future 
suppliers, thus to save time and resources in governing outsourcing relationships. 
Before accessing the field, my priority of scientific research was acknowledged by 
all the participants, while some extent of advisory work for the Governance Project 
was also expected from me. Most importantly, the three organizations, CL, SP1 
and SP2, all agreed on my neutral stance in the case, i.e. I was not working for the 
interest of any of them in particular, but investigating the issue as a non-participate 
researcher. 
3.3 Mixed-method approach 
Mixed-method approach combines qualitative and quantitative methods to elicit 
insights that each of the involved method cannot offer alone. In my study, the 
method of Social Network Analysis (SNA), which is primarily quantitative in 
nature, is concurrently combined with qualitative inquiries to answer the research 
questions with fuller context. In this section, I will first review the purpose of 
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choosing mixed methods, then introduce each method separately, and finally 
elaborate how the two strands of method are integrated. 
3.3.1 Purpose of mixing methods 
Influenced by the interpretive philosophical perspective, the rationale for choosing 
mixed methods is based on two premises as suggested by Mason (2006): 
 The realities, being socially constructed through lived experiences, are 
multi-dimensional.  
 The meanings of social lives, being multi-dimensional, are enacted on both 
macro and micro scales. 
Based on these premises, in interpretive studies the construction of 
interpretations must link across different dimensions and scales. As commonly 
assumed, interpretive research is almost a synonym as “qualitative research” (e.g. 
Mason, 2006; Venkatesh, Brown, & Bala, 2013). However, the practical 
limitations of qualitative research hinders the achievement of breadth on the 
subject matter. Take interview as an example, although an extent of depth can be 
achieved through ‘micro’ investigation, the ‘macro’ aspect, i.e. number of 
interviewees and the coverage of topics, are limited for the given time and 
resource. For a balance of breadth and depth, mixed-method can potentially help 
with a holistic understanding, embracing divergent/complementary views 
(Venkatesh et al., 2013). Moreover, the choice of research methods must be in line 
with the research questions (Mason, 2006; Mingers, 2001; Venkatesh et al., 2013). 
My research questions (see Chapter 1, section 1.1) pertain to the mechanisms and 
structure of ITO governance in the context of multi-sourcing. On one hand, the 
topic of ITO governance is indeed multi-dimensional, and my research questions 
focus on its mechanisms, structure and context. On the other hand, each dimension 
can be investigated in different scales. As defined in Chapter 2, governance 
structure is a ‘macro’ and abstract matter, while governance mechanisms are 
‘micro’ and embodied. The multi-sourcing context itself involves both ‘micro’ and 
‘macro’ scales, with multiple stakeholders both on the organizational level and 
individual level. In this case, mixed-method not only provides methodological 
creativity, but also offer the possibility to explore each dimension and their 
interrelations with meaningful interpretation. In concrete terms, mixed-method 
help to investigate how ITO governance, as a multi-dimensional social 
phenomenon, is embedded in the multi-sourcing context which is equally multi-
scale and complex. 
By definition, mixed-method enables the researcher to combine different 
strands of methods, but what is the expected outcome of such combination? Some 
researchers perceive triangulation as a general epistemological claim on the 
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intended outcome of mixed-method research (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006). Others 
devise more detailed schemes for the rationale of combining methods (Bryman, 
2006; Greene, Caracelli, & Graham, 1989; Venkatesh et al., 2013). In fact, these 
two approaches are not contradictory, as the concept of triangulation has been 
debated and developed into multiple meanings, which are included in most of the 
schemes. Considering its pertinence to IS research, here the scheme of Venkatesh 
et al. (2013) is presented as follows: 
 Complementarity: to obtain complementary views from different methods 
on the same phenomena. 
 Completeness: for a more complete picture of the studied phenomena. 
 Development: using the results of one method in the development of the 
other method.  
 Expansion: to extend the findings of one method with the understandings 
generated with the other method. 
 Corroboration/confirmation: to increase the credibility of research with 
convergent findings from different methods. 
 Compensation: to compensate for the weaknesses of each method by 
combining different methods. 
 Diversity: to obtain divergent views from different methods on the same 
phenomena. 
In my study, the mixed-method approach, including qualitative inquiries and 
social network analysis, is intended to achieve multiple purposes for the case study, 
including corroboration/confirmation, complementarity and diversity. In the next 
three sections, I will elaborate the rationality in the choices and conducts of 
different data collection and analysis methods, as well as how different methods 
are integrated. Following the introduction of each strand of method, specific details 
of my empirical study (e.g. the number of observed meetings, demography 
information of the interviewees, participants of the social network questionnaire 
etc.) are specified. 
3.3.2 Qualitative inquiries 
Qualitative data were generated from various sources during the case study, 
including interviews, documents, meeting observations, and fieldnotes.  
As one of the most common methods to collect qualitative data, interviews are 
pervasive in qualitative research despite the chosen philosophical perspective (i.e. 
positivist, interpretive, or critical) and methodology (e.g. case study, action 
research, ethnography, etc.). In an interpretive case study, interviews enable the 
researcher to access and co-construct the social world together with the 
interviewees, thus deeper insights with situated nuances can be captured through 
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the interactions (Moisander, Valtonen, & Hirsto, 2009). Three types of interviews 
can be classified: structured, semi-structured, and unstructured (Myers, 2013), 
between which the major differences lie in the extent of adherence to pre-
formulated questions, and the reliance on improvisation during the interviews. In 
qualitative research, particularly in IS, semi-structured and unstructured interviews 
are most commonly used (Myers & Newman, 2007). As shown in Figure 14,  given 
my iterative research process, interviews are not only important source of evidence 
for my study, but also an essential link in the dialogic iteration between data and 
theoretical understanding to polish the research question (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 
2008). This requires the role of interviewees to be a collaborative discussant rather 
than a respondent to specific questions (Moisander et al., 2009). Therefore, the 
interviews were all conducted individually, face-to-face, and unstructured, i.e. 
without pre-formulated question list. To achieve the benefit and avoid the 
disadvantages of unstructured interviews (see, e.g. Myers, 2013), a balance 
between over-passivity and over-direction is required during the interviews 
(Walsham, 1995).  
Table 7 Interviews  
Date 
dd.mm.yy 
Place Interviewee Duration 
hh:mm:ss Company Position 
25.06.12 Turku CL Service Delivery Manager 01:00:41 
23.08.12 Stockholm SP1 Customer Manager 00:56:57 
23.08.12 Stockholm CL Head of IT Sourcing 00:57:09 
23.08.12 Stockholm SP1 Service Operation Manager 00:57:42 
23.08.12 Stockholm SP2 Delivery Manager 01:00:10 
24.08.12 Stockholm SP1 Financial Controller 00:56:12 
11.09.12 Stockholm SP1 Delivery Manager 01:02:24 
11.09.12 Stockholm SP1 Continuous Service Manager 00:48:28 
12.09.12 Stockholm CL Service Delivery Manager 00:35:07 
12.09.12 Stockholm CL Head of IT Operations 00:41:35 
12.09.12 Stockholm SP1 Continuous Service Manager 00:41:51 
12.09.12 Stockholm CL Service Delivery Manager 00:29:18 
18.09.12 Turku CL IT Security Manager 00:39:02 
18.09.12 Turku CL Head of Business Liaisons 00:53:33 
25.09.12 Turku CL Head of End-User Services 00:48:47 
11.10.12 Turku CL Availability and Performance 
Manager 
00:52:43 
11.10.12 Turku CL Head of IT Services 00:52:54 
16.10.12 Turku CL Head of Procurement Services 00:42:01 
25.10.12 Turku CL Capacity Service Responsible 00:49:18 
01.11.12 Turku CL Head of Application Infrastructure 00:45:22 
07.11.12 Stockholm SP2 Delivery Manager 00:52:32 
07.11.12 Stockholm SP2 Customer Manager 01:44:33 
08.11.12 (Video call) CL Consultant 00:40:05 
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Altogether, I have conducted 23 interviews with interviewees from all three 
participating companies; all interviews were tap-recorded and transcribed for 
further analysis. Table 7 presents the basic information of the interviews. Due to 
the Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), interviewee’s names are not disclosed 
here. The process of interviews are carried out as follows. First, the conversation 
started with my self-introduction to clarify the purpose and theme of the interview, 
i.e. to focus on the situation of the multi-sourcing governance under investigation. 
Then, I invited the interviewees to elaborate on his/her role in the multi-sourced 
work, inspiring him/her to recall the personal experience on the unique challenges 
in this setting. When the interviewee was talkative, the conversation continues 
naturally without my interruption, unless the conversation became overly 
irrelevant to the topic; if the interviewee talked too little and the conversation broke 
in the course, I would improvise a few questions on the spot to facilitate the 
continuance of discussion. For example, from time to time, I encouraged the 
interviewee to describe memorable examples during his/her work related to 
governance. Through such vivid social interaction, this approach has been 
effective to delineate the rich context and explore through complexity in my case 
study.  
Besides interviews as “researcher provoked data”, I have also collected 
“naturally occurring data” by accessing what the participants are actually doing 
(Silverman, 2006). This includes meeting observations, documents, and field notes 
in different occasions. First, I have conducted non-participant observation 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008) in four of the monthly governance meetings; in 
other words, I listened to the meetings either in the same meeting room or online 
(when the meeting was carried out via video conference), but not participating in 
the conversation during the meeting. In addition, I have also presented my 
preliminary findings to the management team of all three participating companies, 
which served as participant observations for my research. Table 8 provides 
information on each meeting observation. For confidentiality, no tape-recordings 
could be obtained for the meetings; instead, observation notes kept during and after 
each meeting were used for analysis. 
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Table 8 Meeting observations 









(Video conference),  
Service Operation 
Review 
CL: Head of IT operation (1), Availability and 
Performance Manager (1), IT Security Manager (1), 
Service Delivery Manager (5) 
SP1: Service Operation Manager (1), Continuous 
Service Manager (2), Delivery Manager (1) 






CL: Head of IT Sourcing (1), Head of IT operation (1), 
IT Security Manager 
SP1: Customer Manager (1), Financial Controller (1), 
Service Operation Manager (1) 






CL: Service Delivery Manager (3), Consultant (1) 
SP1: Continuous Service Manager (1), Delivery 
Manager (2) 






CL: Head of IT operation (1), Service Delivery Manager 
(6) 
SP1: Service Operation Manager (1), Continuous 
Service Manager (3), Delivery Manager (1) 







findings to the 
management 
University: The researcher  
CL: Head of IT Services (1), Head of Business Liaisons 
(1), Head of IT Sourcing (1), Consultant (1) 
SP1: Customer Manager (1), Service Operation Manager 
(1) 
SP2: Customer Manager (1) 
1.5 
 
In addition to interviews and meeting observations, I was also granted access to 
different company documents relevant to the case, including organization charts, 
documents on formal processes, the governance appendix of the ITO contract, 
various reports presented in the meetings, and meeting minutes. These documents 
formed an important part of the qualitative data, illustrating the context and formal 
practices. Furthermore, field notes were generated during different occasions. For 
instance, before the interview, if there was some waiting time, I would observe 
surroundings and take notes about the office environment or other emerging 
encounters. Sometimes, interesting conversations in the coffee room were also 
recorded afterwards as field notes. Another important piece of field notes was 
captured on the key supporting IS for governance. Although I was not granted full 
access to the system, the interface as well as basic functions and processes were 
shown to me by an expert. 
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3.3.3 Social Network Analysis 
Besides qualitative inquiries, my case study also involves a network approach 
through the method of Social Network Analysis (SNA). SNA is developed 
specifically to investigate the relational aspects of social structures (Scott, 2013). 
Such network approach supports the study of interactions among actors within 
different social relations, in which the network is defined as a set of nodes and ties 
(Barnes, 1954; Mitchell, 1974). Nodes represent the actors in the network, which 
can be defined on different levels, such as individual person, organizations, 
industrial clusters, etc. Ties then illustrates the interactions and relationships 
among the actors. As a network consists of both nodes and ties, such network 
perspective hence shifts from the traditional focus of sociology and management 
on the attributes of individual actors, to the understanding of social interaction in 
its larger context. 
As mentioned in section 3.2, one rationale for the choice of case study 
methodology is to address the complexity of the research topic – multi-sourcing 
governance. Qualitative inquiries, as introduced in the section 3.3.1, are widely 
adopted to investigate dynamic and fuzzy phenomena in their contexts; although 
SNA appears as an entirely different type of method with node-and-tie language, 
it is also effective in generate and structure data to uncover complexity. Thus such 
network approach can be complementary to qualitative material within case study 
research, and the understanding of networks can further advance and renew the 
development of case study methodology (Gummesson, 2007). In addition, for 
studies leveraging SNA, the sampling strategy of a single site is not uncommon 
(Krackhardt, 1990; Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998); especially, the clear boundary of the 
network, as appearing in a single case, is desired in SNA research due to the 
minimal differentiation in context. Therefore, incorporating SNA into this case 
study is appropriate and beneficial. 
The network data can be collected in various ways. Actually, the data collection 
for SNA is not bound to either side of the quantitative/qualitative dichotomy; in 
other words, both quantitative and qualitative approaches can be opted to collect 
network data. Principally, SNA can explore both primary and secondary data, 
including documents, ethnographic field notes, survey results, and so on (Scott, 
2013). Network data is then extracted from one or multiple sources, typically 
involving lists of nodes and ties, which are clearly defined in the analysis. Using 
standard questionnaires, survey method is widely used in network research, 
providing a major data source for SNA (Marsden, 2011). According to Scott 
(2013), surveys are especially useful for collecting whole network data among a 
closed group, but its sampling strategy needs to be carefully considered, which 
concerns the boundary of network under investigation. In my case to investigate 
multi-sourcing relationships, the network can be bounded within any of the 
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participating firms, within a client-vendor dyad, or among all involved parties. 
Hence, the boundary of network can be clearly defined according to the purpose 
of investigation. Once the boundary is determined, a whole network analysis is 
beneficial to understand the dynamics and structure within the selected group of 
outsourcing participants. Moreover, due to the limitation of access, a continuous 
ethnographic observation is not viable in my case study, thus SNA through field 
notes is not an option for me. Therefore, I opted for the questionnaire method 
collecting network data with a questionnaire. To keep the conduct of this 
questionnaire method coherent with my interpretive stance of philosophical 
perspective, i.e. to achieve the “internal coherence” suggested by Sarker et al. 
(2013), I strived to minimize my own pre-assumption and control on the design of 
questionnaire. This is realized through avoiding leading questions to leave more 
neutral choice for the respondents. Unlike common surveys for statistical analysis, 
the questionnaires for SNA contain mostly indirect questions, which means the 
listed questions are almost unrelated to the research question per se. In my case, 
the SNA questionnaire only contains questions on who interacts with whom in 
different contexts, which is not directly related to my research question pertaining 
to multi-sourcing governance. The sense-making of raw data to answer the 
research question thus heavily relies on my own interpretation through the 
integration of both network and qualitative data, as well as the chosen method of 
data analysis. 
Through the network approach, different characteristics of ties can be 
recognized, which is defined as multiplexity, representing multiple interests that 
connect the actors. For instance, two employees in the same work group may 
interact in multiplex relationships, if they are colleagues and also friends. 
Similarly, the network of this group can be simultaneously analysed as an advisory 
network and as a friendship network. Therefore, networks are contextually 
constructed, and the examination on the same group of nodes can yield a 
multiplexity of networks, which can be compared for meaningful interpretations. 
In this study, a structural comparison between formal and informal networks is 
applied to unfold the extent of formalization (Rank, 2008) in this ITO network. As 
ITO governance structures are associated with the degree of formalization both in 
each firm and in the sourcing relationship across firms, the structural comparison 
also needs to be carried out both internally in each client/vendor firm, and in the 
cross-firm networks.  
Besides the interpretations through understanding of multiplexity, the network 
approach can also be leveraged to bridge the gap between the understandings on 
the macro (i.e. organizational) level and on the micro (i.e. individual) level, 
because it “allows researchers to capture the interactions of any individual unit 
within the larger field of activity to which the unit belongs” (Kilduff & Tsai, 2003, 
p.13). Similar to the approach of Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, and Tsai (2004), a 
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dyadic ITO relationship can be perceived in two levels: 1) the client and vendor as 
nodes, and the sourcing relationship as a tie; 2) individual employees from each 
participating firm as nodes, and their interrelations as ties. In addition, on the 
organizational level, more actors (e.g. other organizations such as competitors, 
customers, and other clients) can join the network as other nodes, thus we can also 
involve ties beyond the outsourcing dyad to the scenario of multi-sourcing with 
multiple vendors, or even multi-client and multi-vendor sourcing network (see 
Figure 16).  
 
Figure 16 Multi-layer networks of outsourcing 
In the specific context of ITO governance, interpersonal networks can serve as 
a proxy to assess the practice of governance elements such as coordination and 
inter-organizational linkages (Lin, 2013). Thus with the method of SNA, we can 
illustrate an assemblage of network ties to obtain structural insights on governance 
practice, which is an essential aspect to answer the research question. The SNA in 
my case involves active participants from CL and SP1. As mentioned in 3.2.2, only 
five people from SP2 are involved in this multi-sourcing case, and the three 
interviews I conducted have already covered the network information both among 
themselves and between SP2 and other two firms, hence SP2 is not included in the 
scope of my SNA. In contrary to SP2, a large number of CL’s employees are 
directly or indirectly involved in the governance project. Since SNA require a 
higher response rate compared to traditional statistic method, it is essential to 
access the most active participants for the analysis. To achieve an effective 
selection of participants, I first started the social network questionnaire among all 
the 24 team members in SP1, considering this appropriate group size to construct 
the network. In this first questionnaire, in addition to the questions related to their 
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internal network, i.e. their interactions with own colleagues, I requested each 
respondent to select 10 persons from CL whom they contacted most frequently in 
their daily work. 23 people out of the 24 responded to the questionnaire, achieving 
a response rate of 95.8%. The result of this first SNA suggested 49 frequent 
contacts of SP1 from CL. Together with CL’s business liaison manager, based on 
the list of 49 names, we obtained an updated participant list for the second SNA; 
the new list consists of 61 employees, for which we excluded the retired or 
transferred people, and added names who were not mentioned by SP1 but also with 
key roles in the governance. The second SNA questionnaire received 51 responses 
(83.6%). Table 9 summarizes the network construction and analysis carried out in 
the two SNAs and used in each paper. More details of each SNA are presented in 
Paper 2 and Paper 3.  
Table 9 SNA: network construction and analysis 
 Participant 
Company (Nr.) 
Network construction Analysis methods in each paper 
SNA 1 SP1 (24)  Internal network  
 Directed external 
network:  
SP1=>CL 
 Paper 2: Density and Quadratic 
Assignment Procedure (QAP) 
on internal and external 
networks  
 Paper 3: Density comparison 
between units and between 
governance levels  
SNA 2 CL (61)  Directed external 
network: CL=>SP1 
 Paper 3: Density comparison 
between units and between 
governance levels  
3.3.4 Interpretive integration 
Now that each strand of method has been introduced, I will discuss the relations 
between these methods, as well as the process to form such relations. A set of key 
questions have been identified to construct the typology of mixed-method research 
(Bryman, 2006; Moran-Ellis et al., 2006; Venkatesh et al., 2013): 
1. Are the qualitative and quantitative data collected in parallel or in different 
phases? 
2. Are both qualitative and quantitative methods treated as equal? 
3. Are different methods orienting to the same research objective? 
4. At which stage of the research does the interaction occur between 
methods? 
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The first question concerns two major strategies for the research design of 
mixed-method: concurrent and sequential (Venkatesh et al., 2013). As mentioned 
in the end of section 3.3.1, my purpose of mixing methods for the study is for 
complementarity and diversity; in other words, mixed-method is used to obtain 
diverse perspectives and compare different results for the understanding of the 
phenomenon. To achieve such objective, a concurrent design is adopted. Although 
the empirical work did start with qualitative interviews to gain rapport with some 
key participants in order to facilitate the subsequent data collection, the conduct of 
interviews did not affect the design and interpretation of the SNA questionnaire. 
Hence, the data collection and analysis of the two methods are considered as 
simultaneous, following the concurrent design strategy.  
Decisions about question 2 and 3 bear on the chosen process to form the 
relations between different methods, being combined or integrated (Moran-Ellis et 
al., 2006). If both qualitative and quantitative methods are treated with equal 
weight, and their findings are interdependent and aiming for a common research 
question, the process can be identified as integration. Contrarily, if one method is 
dominant, the findings are independent with minimal interface, and different 
methods are oriented to different research questions, the methods are considered 
as combined rather than integrated. In this sense, my study applies the process of 
integration to bring the findings of qualitative inquiries and SNA into meaningful 
relation.  
The last question refers to the point when integration, in my case, occurs during 
the research. According to the review of Moran-Ellis et al. (2006), the term 
“integration of methods” is only reserved for studies where the interaction of 
methods takes place from the earliest stage of the research process, i.e. when 
identifying the research topic and formulating research questions in the start of 
iteration (see Figure 14). However, other approaches which conduct the 
intermeshing in later stages of research can also be recognized as “integration”, 
including “separate methods, integrated analysis”, and “separate methods, 
separate analysis, theoretical integration” (Moran-Ellis et al., 2006, p.54, p.55). 
My research opted for the latter approach of “interpretive integration” (Moran-
Ellis et al., 2006, p.55), in which integration occurs after findings of both methods 
have been generated, when the knowledge out of both methods is brought together 
for a coherent interpretation.  
This approach of interpretive integration is also in line with the notion of “meta-
inference” defined by Venkatesh et al. (2013) as the integration of qualitative and 
quantitative findings. They also emphasize the imperative nature of such inference, 
since it pertains to the primary objective of mixed-method. Integration at this stage 
enables an open attitude for the corroboration of methods, as well as 
contradictions, divergences, and complementary elements emerged during each 
strand of analysis. If such interpretation focuses on opposing findings, the 
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technique of bracketing can be leveraged (Venkatesh et al., 2013). Bracketing is 
particularly useful to deal with surprising findings by reconciling and explaining 
the contradictions in the final interpretation to obtain new theoretical 
understanding. Another approach for meta-inference, as recognized by Venkatesh 
et al. (2013), is bridging. Differing from bracketing, the process of bridging is 
followed to build a consensus between the two strands of findings. This choice of 
different integration approach should be consistent with the purpose of mixing 
methods. To achieve complementarity and diversity, bracketing is more suitable; 
while for corroboration and confirmation, bridging is a coherent choice. Through 
either approach, the aim is always to transcend the understandings out of each 
method and generate knowledge beyond the offer of either individual method. 
3.4 Implementation of methods 
This section introduces methods adopted in all the four papers included in this 
dissertation, and clarifies my role and share of work in each co-authored paper (i.e. 
Paper 1 and Paper 2). Paper 1 is a conceptual article on ITO governance; among 
the empirical papers, Paper 2 and 3 both apply mixed methods, whereas Paper 4 is 
solely based on qualitative data. Table 10 summarizes the implementation of 
methods and usage of empirical data in each paper. 
Paper 1 reviews the concept of governance in ITO literature. The paper consists 
of two parts: 1) a literature review particularly within IS discipline, and 2) a 
synthesis of prior knowledge from reference disciplines besides IS. As the first 
author, I structured the whole paper together with my co-author, while focusing on 
the first part of literature review. Individually, I have collected and analysed all the 
relevant literature from the IS basket journals to identify two major research 
strands; subsequently, my co-author discussed my results in the light of reference 
disciplines to identify research gaps and future directions. My responsible part of 
literature review is also most relevant to this dissertation, forming a solid 
theoretical foundation for the whole study. 
Paper 2 zooms in to supplier’s perspective of the governance structure with 
mixed methods. The empirical material was collected in SP1, including six face-
to-face interviews (see Table 7) and an SNA questionnaire among the entire team 
of 24 people (see Table 9). Under the theoretical framework adapted from  Miranda 
and Kavan’s (2005) MoG model, the mixed methods first corroborates findings 
from the two strands of data; the analysis of qualitative interviews is to identify 
certain characteristics pertaining to governance structure, while density analysis 
and QAP in the SNA delineate and compare the configuration of internal and 
external networks within formal and informal as well as face-to-face and virtual 
contexts. The findings from both strands are then integrated into the theoretical 
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framework using the approach of bridging to achieve consensus. In addition, 
different methods also cover complementary elements in the theoretical 
framework. For example, the governance elements of coordination, conflict 
resolution, affect, and shared understandings are investigated with interview 
method, whereas the element on inter-organizational linkages is studied with the 
support of SNA. As to my role in this co-authored paper, I should be positioned as 
the main contributor, since I initiated the work and finished the first draft 
independently. Then my co-author joined the work and contributed, as an 
experienced researcher, to refine the paper by adding relevant literature, deepening 
the theoretical discussion, and proofing the text together with me. She also kindly 
guided me through the journal submission process. As the main contributor, I have 
fulfilled the empirical work, the choice of theoretical framework, as well as 
preliminary findings and conclusions independently. The empirical work was also 
an important part of the entire dissertation project. 
Table 10 Methods applied in each paper 
Papers Methods Purpose of 
mixed methods 
Interpretive 
integration Qualitative SNA 





 Literature review 
 Conceptual discussion 
N/A N/A 






 6 interviews in 
SP1 
 Participants: 24 
(SP1) 































 Participants: 24 
























SP1 and SP2 
 23 interviews 
in all 
organizations 




 Field notes 
N/A N/A N/A 
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Expanding the scope from the supplier organization to the ITO dyad, Paper 3 is 
another mixed-method attempt to compare Governance-in-Contract (GiC) and 
Governance-in-Practice (GiP) in the dyad between CL and SP1. The qualitative 
data source is a 29-page document of “Governance Appendix” for this particular 
ITO relationship, which was last updated in 2010; SNA was conducted among 24 
people from SP1 (using the results of external networks from the same 
questionnaire as in Paper 2), and 61 people from CL (see Table 9). While the 
document analysis reveals the communication structure defined in the contract (i.e. 
GiC), the SNA compares the network density between different units and different 
governance levels in both cluster of networks pertaining to technical and non-
technical issues (i.e. GiP). In this way, the mixed methods fulfilled both purpose 
of complementarity and diversity, offering understanding on the same phenomena 
of governance with complementary views of GiC and GiP, while contrasting them 
for surprising divergence. The approach of bracketing is followed in the 
interpretive integration, to reconcile the contradictions in the findings of each 
method.  
The last paper, Paper 4, finally covers the multi-sourcing governance among all 
parties, involving CL, SP1 and SP2. Differing from the above-mentioned two 
empirical papers, this paper derives from pure qualitative data collected for this 
dissertation, including 23 interviews (see Table 7), four non-participant meeting 
observations (see Table 8), documents, and field notes. The one participant 
meeting observation (see Table 8) was not mentioned in this paper, but it also 
helped in understanding the case background and confirming some of the findings 





This chapter summarizes findings of each research paper, and explains how each 
paper answers the sub-questions and contributes to the main research question. 
4.1 The concept of governance in ITO 
Paper 1 is a conceptual paper reviewing prior IS research on ITO governance, and 
suggesting research gaps and future directions in the light of relevant research in 
reference disciplines. It forms an important part of theoretical basis for this 
dissertation (see section 2.2). 
Recognizing the problem of vague conceptualization on ITO governance, the 
paper begins by reviewing relevant article in the “Senior Scholars’ Basket of 
Journals” in the field of IS. This literature review identifies two strands of 
governance research: governance structure and governance mechanisms, which 
are different in conceptualization while highly interrelated as integral aspects of 
governance. The definitions and development of the two concepts have been 
elaborated in section 2.2, thus will not be repeated here in details. However, as key 
findings of this paper, it is worth revisiting the major terminologies related to each 
concept. Three types of governance structure are identified in the ITO literature: 
market, hierarchy, and network. The three structures have been mostly studied as 
‘pure’ types; hybrid structures, although intuitively pervasive, still lack empirical 
investigation. The synthesis of prior literature also identified the typology of 
governance mechanisms into contractual governance and relational governance. 
Unlike the research on governance structure, the interaction between contractual 
and relational governance has been extensively discussed by ITO researchers. In 
addition, governance mechanisms involve different elements such as contract and 
control, exhibiting different characteristics in contractual and relational 
governance. The value of such conceptualization lies in the clarification and 
integration of originally dispersed terminologies, which deepens the meaning of 
“structuring the governance” as “the combination of an appropriate portfolio of 
governance structures, together with different coordination mechanisms” (Lin & 
Vaia, 2015, p.12) in different contexts.  
Based on the literature review within IS, the paper then enlarges the scope by 
introducing relevant research in reference disciplines, such as organization study, 
management, marketing, etc., to discuss how the ITO research community, in 
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particular, can learn from these reference disciplines on the conceptualization of 
ITO governance. Different reference theories are briefly reviewed to shed light on 
the theoretical gaps in the research of ITO governance, including Transaction Cost 
Economics, Agency Theory, Control Theory, Contingency Theory, Network 
Theory, and so on. This analysis reveals the need for an integrated framework to 
theorize governance. It also calls for the evaluation on the effectiveness of 
governance under different contexts. Indeed, to address these gaps, more inter-
disciplinary studies on governance will be necessary in the future research. 
The paper contributes to the research question by clarifying the core concepts 
of governance structure and governance mechanisms. It also serves as a foundation 
for the empirical studies in this dissertation, which then updated the theoretical 
framework with empirical evidence and also contextualized it into the multi-
sourcing scenario. 
4.2 Vendor’s governance structure 
Paper 2 is an intra-organizational study from the vendor’s perspective, and it 
empirically examines vendor’s governance structure in the context of interpersonal 
networks. The application of SNA is illustrated as an effective method to reflect 
governance practice, and the first sub-question is answered with empirical 
evidence: How do vendor’s interpersonal networks deviate from their perceived 
governance structure? 
This sub-question is answered with two strands of findings, as well as the 
interrelations between them. First, with qualitative data out of interviews, we 
analyzed the perceived governance structure by the vendor team with reference to 
the characteristics of governance elements, including coordination, conflict 
resolution, inter-organizational linkages, affect, and shared understandings (see 
Miranda & Kavan, 2005). Accordingly, hierarchy governance was identified as the 
general structure, based on the document-based coordination, formally distributive 
conflict resolution, formal forums as main linkages, low level of trust affect and 
limited understandings being shared. However, exceptions were also observed, 
that one interviewee shows the willingness and practice to promote network 
governance in the outsourcing dyad, by establishing a closer personal and 
professional relationship with the client. 
The other strand of findings, pertaining to the interpersonal networks, were 
examined with SNA. To leverage from the network multiplexity, we constructed 
five types of networks: formal and face-to-face, formal and virtual, informal and 
face-to-face, informal and virtual, and personal/social. These multiplex networks 
are under two overarching sets: internal networks (i.e. 24 members of the SP1 
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team) and external networks (i.e. unidirectional network from 24 members of SP1 
to 88 members of CL)1.  
The SNA results resonate with the interview findings in several aspects, 
showing how networks reflect governance structure. On the execution of 
governance, formal coordination and conflict resolution is reflected by the higher 
density of formal networks over informal networks. Moreover, in both sets of 
internal and external networks, the close correlation between formal and informal 
networks are found in the same context (i.e. face-to-face or virtual). This can be 
explained that the coordination process in this ITO dyad is so heavily reliant on 
formal forums, such as scheduled meetings, that people tend to make informal 
communications almost only before or after such formal meetings. On the elements 
of social capital (i.e. inter-organizational linkages, affect, and shared 
understandings), the importance of formality and professionalism over personal 
relationships are also revealed by the networks. On one hand, lowest density is 
found in non-work related personal/social networks within both internal and 
external networks, indicating the level of affect towards hierarchical 
characteristics. On the other hand, compared to external networks, in the internal 
networks, the density is significantly higher, and the correlation of personal/social 
networks with other types of professional networks is stronger. Thus affect and 
shared understandings are considered lower in the external networks (i.e. between 
the vendor and client) in comparison to the internal networks. In summary, the 
characteristics of hierarchy governance is indeed reflected by the networks. 
The findings also illustrates how the network features may influence governance 
structure. The main influence factor is the dispersed geographic locations of client 
and vendor, manifested as the higher density of virtual networks over face-to-face 
networks. Meanwhile, the close relation in formal networks between face-to-face 
and virtual contexts also reflect such location matter, because the same set of 
scheduled meetings are held both face-to-face and virtually to save travel costs. 
Such dispersed locations reinforced the hierarchy governance, and hampered the 
emergence of network governance, as frequent interactions are more difficult when 
people sit far away from each other. 
Despite the reflection and influence between interpersonal networks and 
perceived governance structure, the case also shows an exception where deviation 
occurs. Beyond professional relations, close personal friendships are observed 
between an employee of SP1 and his/her counterparts in CL. This person may 
potentially become the bridge to transform the ITO governance structure into 
network governance. However, such extrapolation needs to be confirmed with 
further studies.  
This paper contributes to answer the research question with vendor’s 
perspective. The findings mainly suggest reflection and influence between ITO 
                                                 
1 In the original paper, SP1 is referred to as Alpha, and CL is referred to as Beta. 
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governance structure and vendor’s internal and external networks, particularly in 
the context where hierarchy governance dominates. However, deviation is also 
observed with potential to transform the relationship into network governance. The 
method and findings of this study can also be applied in different vendors in multi-
sourcing relationships, in order to learn about each vendor’s internal perspectives 
hence contribute to the overall multi-sourcing strategy. 
4.3 Governance in an ITO dyad 
Paper 3 studies the ITO dyad between the client (CL) and one of the vendors 
(SP1) 1 , focusing on network elements of Governance-in-Contract (GiC) and 
Governance-in-Practice (GiP). Through the mixed methods of qualitative 
document analysis and SNA, the findings contrast GiC and GiP on the aspect of 
governance structure, and answer the second sub-question: How does governance 
practice deviate from the ITO contract between client and one of the vendors? 
Two of the governance elements, i.e. coordination and inter-organizational 
linkages, pertain to the web of interactions among participants, which is defined 
as practices of GiP. Other elements, including conflict resolution, extent of trust 
and extent of shared understandings, relate to each participants’ actions in 
governance and are defined as praxis of GiP. A practice-based network embraces 
praxis as nodes, and practices as ties. Due to the page restriction of this conference 
paper, only practices are empirically examined in this study.  
First, the governance appendix of the ITO contract between CL and SP1 is 
analyzed for GiC. As a result, the structure of hierarchy governance is identified 
in GiC, with the document-based feature of coordination and standardized 
processes for the inter-organizational linkages. The stipulated communication 
structure is also illustrated with clear hierarchical levels. Then, leveraging the 
method of SNA, GiP (i.e. only the part of practices) is investigated in terms of 
daily communication networks related to governance. Specifically, network 
density is compared between different units, to reveal the pattern of inter-
organizational linkages; while both communications of technical and non-
technical issues are extracted between different hierarchical levels of governance 
to uncover the coordination between CL and SP1. According to SNA findings, the 
inter-organizational linkages in GiP show characteristics of network governance 
contrasting with overwhelming hierarchical governance in GiC, with direct and 
informal linkages skipping the contractually stipulated intermediaries. Meanwhile, 
regarding coordination, GiP involves both characteristics of hierarchy and network 
governance, as different roles in the governance structure adjust their activities on 
                                                 
1 In the original paper, the company of CL is referred to as NI, and its IT department as DIS; while the 
company of SP1 is referred to as KIM, and the team exclusively working for the client as KIM1. 
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the basis of emerging needs instead of strictly sticking to the formal stipulations. 
Hence, by separating GiC and GiP, the findings reveal the form of hybrid 
governance with co-existence of hierarchy and network structures, and that these 
two alternatives of governance structure are only ideal-typical forms. 
As to the question of how governance practice deviates from the contract, the 
findings are mixed. On one hand, the empirical study shows GiC as a reference 
and guideline for GiP based on the evidence of conformity, to a certain extent, in 
the coordination patterns. On the other hand, the deviation of GiP from GiC are 
also observed in various areas, which suggests a direction to modify and improve 
the governance contract on the basis of daily practice. Thus, regarding the relations 
between contract and practice, not only the contract needs to be viewed as 
precedent of practice, but also practice should be learnt as a source of reference for 
the evaluation and improvement of contract. 
As an integral part of the multi-sourcing case study, this paper contributes to the 
research question from the perspective of one ITO dyad within the multi-sourcing 
relationship, focusing on the contract and practice. The findings can be generalized 
to other dyadic relationships, e.g. between client and another vendor, or between 
the vendors if they have a mutual contract. Especially, extending these findings to 
a multi-vendor scenario, it should be cautioned that a standard contract may not 
always work in the governance practice with different vendors, and that the 
contract cannot be static from the beginning to the end, but needs to be regularly 
updated during the whole course based on emerging practice. 
4.4 Governance of the multi-sourcing triad 
Paper 4 finally involves all parties of the multi-sourcing triad in this cases study. 
Departing from the two governance concepts reviewed in Paper 1, this paper 
constructed a refined framework aligning the structures and mechanisms of ITO 
governance. The empirical work is entirely based on qualitative material, revealing 
the deviation in perception and practice among all parties on the multi-sourcing 
governance. By illustrating how such deviation occurs together with tension and 
conflicts in multi-sourcing, this paper answers the last sub-question: How does 
practice deviate from perception in the ITO governance among client and multiple 
vendors?   
The findings begin with the identification of governance mechanisms both in 
perception and in practice among all multi-sourcing parties, including contract, 
control, and the supporting information system. Subsequently, the mechanisms are 
mapped into two possible governance structures for this multi-sourcing 
relationship, i.e. hierarchy and network governance. On contract, the perception is 
dominated by the structure of hierarchy governance, featured by promissory 
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contract and guardian vendor model that are commonly agreed; in other words, all 
parties agree upon the promissory contract in perception, in which the guardian 
vendor model is adopted with SP1 as the middle link. However, although hierarchy 
structure is followed by SP1, as they tried to maintain this contractual structure in 
practice, network structure also emerge between CL and SP2 manifested as 
psychological contract via direct connections skipping the middle link of SP1. The 
control mechanisms, both in perception and practice, fall into hybrid structure 
featuring both hierarchy and network characteristics. Perceived control 
mechanisms such as trust, identities and values are mapped into hierarchy 
structure, which have in turn influenced related practice. However, discrepancies 
of perception and practice also emerge. On one hand, although the formal control, 
as perceived by CL, is generally practiced through regular governance reports and 
meetings, informal control in form of workarounds are also observable in practice. 
On the other hand, in perception, CL expected a close partnership between the two 
suppliers to foster network governance with higher efficiency, but in practice only 
minimal interactions occur between SP1 and SP2. As to the supporting information 
system, it is perceived to follow a formal design being a coordination tool under a 
hierarchy structure. Although such system is initiated and followed by SP1 in 
practice, SP2 uses the system in a more flexible way, creating various workarounds 
from the system which are actually accommodated by CL. Thus the practice of the 
information system is also under a mixed hierarchy and network structure.  
The elaboration in the last paragraph not only answers the sub-question 
concerning multi-sourcing governance in perception and in practice, but also 
brings important contributions to the main research question by addressing upon 
all participants in this multi-sourcing case. The deviation of perception and 
practice derives from the governance context itself, which involves each 
participant’s internal characteristics and practices. In this case, the two suppliers’ 
disparity in organizational identities and practices is not compatible with the 
designed governance featured by hierarchy structure; such structure would need a 
high level of formality to ensure fluent workflow, but the two suppliers are not 
able to work under the same process. For future improvement, this multi-sourcing 
relationship will need to be restructured from the guardian vendor model to a more 
suitable model, in which the client manages the two suppliers directly without 
middle links. Extrapolated from this case, if the two (or more) suppliers are similar 
in organizational identities and practices, guardian vendor model will be more 
efficient in the multi-sourcing relationship. 
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5 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter concludes the dissertation. First, the answers to the research question 
are summarized. Then, both theoretical and practical contributions are clarified. 
Last but not least, the limitations are pointed out in order to motivate future 
research. 
5.1 Answering the research questions 
This section will incorporate key findings for an integrative answer to the main 
research question:  
 
RQ: How does governance practice deviate from the formal and perceived 
governance model in IT multi-sourcing? 
 
Before the research question can be answered, the conceptualization of 
governance must be clarified. Paper 1 fulfilled this purpose and conceptualized 
ITO governance into governance mechanisms and structure. While all the 
empirical papers follow the basis of this conceptualization, they also contribute to 
the theoretical development by enriching the framework with empirical evidences. 
Especially, the relations between governance structure and governance 
mechanisms are addressed in the empirical work. Explicitly in Paper 4, different 
governance mechanisms (i.e. contract, control, and information system) are 
mapped into different governance structures (i.e. hierarchy and network). 
Moreover, the context of multi-sourcing has been unfolded as the scope of the 
empirical setting is gradually expanded from Paper 2 to Paper 4, starting from 
inside a vendor’s organization to the ITO dyad, and finally zooming out to the 
entire multi-sourcing relationship. Such research design is intended to delineate 
the governance landscape from different perspectives and across multiple 
organizational levels. In addition, interpersonal networks are explored as a proxy 
to certain aspect of governance, especially in Paper 2 and Paper 3, which have 
illustrated how governance can be reflected and assessed with networks.  
Indeed, empirical evidences at all levels suggest the existence of deviations in 
governance structure, either manifested with a dominant structure with a minor 
variation, or in form of parallel structures. In Paper 2, traces of evidence on 
network governance are observed under the dominating hierarchy governance; 
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while in Paper 3 and Paper 4, the two structures stand in parallel: with hierarchy 
structure in contract and network structure in practice (Paper 3), or with both 
structures co-exist in perception and in practice (Paper 4). Such deviation also 
occurs between multi-sourcing participants. In Paper 2 and Paper 4, the 
governance characteristics of the two vendors have been contrasted: while 
hierarchy governance dominates SP1, SP2 has a higher tendency to practice 
network governance. In addition, Paper 3 and Paper 4 show the complexity and 
conflicts of governance among different parties, when contract, perception, and 
practice are simultaneously considered.  
Table 11 summarizes the answers to the research question, with the key answers 
marked in grey cells. This table is organized in two columns, while the left column 
elaborate findings based on the investigated case, the column on the right offers 
suggestions for improving governance in a similar context. The key answer to the 
research question is located under case findings, because the deviation in multi-
sourcing governance centres on the observed happenings in the empirical case. The 
suggestions on the governance structure and mechanisms aim to conceive the 
‘ideal’ governance under the same vendor portfolio, thus are related but not 
intended as direct answers to the research question.  
Table 11 Answering the research question 
 Case Findings Suggestions 
RQ How does governance practice deviate from the formal and 





SP1: Hierarchy governance, 
dominated by contractual 
mechanisms (Paper 2) 
SP2: Network governance, 
dominated by relational 
mechanisms (Paper 4) 
Each participant’s internal 
governance needs to be 






mechanisms in the 
inter-organizational 
relationships 
CL – SP1: hierarchy structure in 
contract and network structure in 
practice (Paper 3),  
CL – SP1, SP2: with both 
structures co-exist in perception 
and in practice among all three 
participants (Paper 4) 
Consistent governance 
structures are needed in 
contract, in perception, 
and in practice. 
Contractual governance 
mechanisms are suggested 
between CL and SP1, and 
relational governance 
between CL and SP2. 
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5.2 Theoretical contribution 
From a theoretical perspective, this dissertation contributes to the understanding 
of ITO governance in three domains: the governance of ITO in general, the 
governance of multi-sourcing in particular, and the novel attempt in research 
methodology.  
For the domain of ITO governance, the literature review (Paper 1) has 
synthesized prior knowledge into two important research strands, i.e. governance 
structure and governance mechanisms, while identifying the lack of integrated 
frameworks to incorporate both concepts of governance under certain contexts. In 
this study, I proposed a research framework integrating both governance structure 
and governance mechanisms, through the dialogue between literature review and 
empirical work. Initially, Miranda and Kavan’s (2005) MoG model was used as a 
theoretical scaffolding (Sarker et al., 2013; Walsham, 1995), which is expanded 
and revised into my own theoretical framework (see Table 4 in Chapter 2). This 
framework is gradually constructed while the empirical context is being zoomed 
out from a single vendor to the whole multi-sourcing triad, and it illustrates how 
different mechanisms emerge under different governance structures in the post-
adoption stage of outsourcing. Hence, the MoG model is not only revised with 
empirical evidence on the post-adoption stage, but also enriched with two more 
mechanisms in addition to contract, i.e. control and supporting information system 
(see Paper 4). Moreover, this study also expanded the MoG model, which was 
originally intended only for inter-organizational context, by adding the intra-
organizational scope (Paper 2).  
Besides MoG model, this study also contributes to the heated discussion on the 
substitution and complementarity of contractual and relational governance 
mechanisms (Huber et al., 2013; Lioliou et al., 2014; Poppo & Zenger, 2002; 
Tiwana, 2004), by addressing the relationship between governance structure and 
governance mechanisms. I argue that different forms of governance mechanisms 
will emerge under different governance structures. For instance, the result of Paper 
2 discovered higher density of formal, in comparison to informal, interpersonal 
networks as a typical form of contractual governance mechanism, when formal 
and informal networks have high level of correlation; while prior research (e.g. 
Kratzer, Gemuenden & Lettl 2008) suggests denser informal interactions when 
formal and informal networks show only marginal correlations. Such discrepancy 
in findings confirms my argument on the fit between governance mechanisms and 
governance structure. In my case, under hierarchy governance, contractual 
mechanisms prevail; whereas in other contexts of network governance (e.g. 
Kratzer, Gemuenden & Lettl 2008), relational mechanisms thrive and overwhelm 
contractual mechanisms. Therefore, the substitution and/or complementarity of 
contractual and relational governance depends on the governance structure as an 
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overarching context. Furthermore, this study also contribute to the understanding 
of ITO governance by distilling the practice of governance from the general 
concept. I have compared practice from contract and perception of governance (see 
Paper 3, Paper 4), and uncovered the consistencies and discrepancies in the same 
case. Such comparison probes into deeper nuances of ITO governance, and 
enriches the concept with multiple dimensions and aspects.  
Through the analysis on governance in both ITO research and reference 
disciplines (Paper 1), another recognized research gap is the relations between the 
chosen governance and the characteristics of the involved firms. This is 
particularly relevant to the governance of multi-sourcing, where the increased 
number of participating firms would inevitably introduce heterogeneity into the 
relationship. In this study, Paper 2 discusses governance from a vendor’s 
perspective, which is further associated with the vendor’s interpersonal networks. 
Although the paper involves only one vendor in the investigation, it shows how a 
firm’s internal networks can reflect governance structure, thus contributes to multi-
sourcing governance with a method to assess the heterogeneous characteristics of 
participants. On this basis, the fit of vendor portfolio and the multi-sourcing 
governance structure is explored in Paper 4, which further contributes to close this 
research gap in a multi-sourcing scenario. Specifically, the misfit between vendor 
portfolio and governance structure induces the divergence between perception and 
practice, which ultimately results in the conflict and tension observed in the multi-
sourcing relationship. This finding also has implication on vendor selection in 
multi-sourcing, thus closes the feedback loop for the “How” sub-stage of ITO (See 
Figure 13). 
The composition of four research papers contributes to multi-sourcing research 
by illustrating the benefits of zooming in and out from the multilateral relationships 
to construct the overall picture with different aspects and scopes. It underlines that 
to study multi-sourcing, the basic input from each dyadic relationship should not 
be overlooked. In essence, vendor’s task allocation and interdependency are 
unique features of multi-sourcing, which should be carefully investigated on the 
basis of general understanding of dyadic ITO relationships. Here it is also worth 
mentioning the examined role of supporting information systems in multi-sourcing 
(Paper 4), as an integral part of governance structure. It is particularly relevant to 
multi-sourcing, due to the increase of complexity in communication and 
cooperation. In my findings, vendors’ different practices on such system are 
related to their organizational characteristics. This is consistent with early research 
on interaction theory (Markus, 1983) between systems and organizational 
contexts, and brings new insights into the domain of multi-sourcing research.  
Methodologically, this study has attempted a novel approach with mixed 
methods of SNA and qualitative inquiries under an interpretive stance. While SNA 
is used to extract social relationships with a network perspective, qualitative 
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inquiries are leveraged to contextually investigate the dynamic and fuzzy 
phenomenon of governance; the findings of these two methods are then combined 
in the process of interpretive integration. This attempt confirms the viability and 
benefit of such approach, and provides a rich illustration of methodological 
conduct for researchers who would like to perform mixed methods in similar ways.  
5.3 Practical contribution 
For practitioners, the value of this study also lies in ITO in general and multi-
sourcing in particular. On ITO governance, the conceptualization and 
methodology of the case study both have implication for practice. On one hand, 
the concept of governance is deconstructed into governance structure and 
governance mechanisms, as well as their interrelations. Such deconstruction 
enables better assessment of the status quo on ITO governance, and facilitates 
practitioners to pinpoint problem areas with greater clarity. On the other hand, the 
SNA exemplified in this study is not only an effective method for research, but 
also a useful tool to visually illustrate different organizational networks, whether 
governance related or in other areas. Specifically for governance, the analysis of 
networks can reveal the day-to-day practice of participants, thus supports to 
contrast governance in contract, perception and practice. With this information, 
decision makers can find areas for potential improvement, where the illustration 
of networks does not match with expectations, especially during the negotiation 
for ITO contract updates.  
Particularly on multi-sourcing, the elaboration of the case and the findings of 
the study can help practitioners to build awareness on the choice of multi-sourcing 
models. First, different multi-sourcing models are discussed in the reference of 
prior literature, which can be utilized by practitioners during the consideration of 
their own multi-sourcing model. Then, the empirical case presents situations where 
possible conflicts would occur due to the discrepancy of perception and practice, 
as well as misfit of the outsourcing governance and vendor structure, thus 
informing practitioners to avoid such unnecessary conflicts with effective 
adjustments in governance. The decision of vendor positioning, including multi-
sourcing model, task allocation, and vendor interdependency (Bapna et al., 2010), 
must be based on contextual characteristics across different levels, in order to 
mitigate or even avoid the discrepancies and conflicts in governance. Last but not 
least, the study specifically implies to the client part, that multi-sourcing is not a 
simple “pay-and-buy” business. After the selection of vendors, the client not only 
need to enhance their own capabilities to manage the relationships, but also to learn 
about and adapt the governance structure to fit vendors’ internal characteristics. 
Multi-sourcing governance is not “carved in stones” once the contract is signed, 
75 
but rather requires frequent reviews and adjustments to fit with the evolving client-
vendor and vendor-vendor relationships. This view is in line with Lempinen and 
Rajala’s (2014) practical suggestions to IS managers in the client organization, 
who has the responsibilities to facilitate the interactions and avoid conflicts 
between multiple parties. 
For this particular case of my empirical study, the optimized positioning of 
vendors is extrapolated from the empirical learnings (see Table 12), differing from 
the status quo at the time of data collection. It is worth mentioning that in a 
different context, e.g. with a different vendor portfolio, the positioning of vendors 
should be different from the suggestions in Table 12. This is to say, that the 
selection of a multi-sourcing model, as introduced in Chapter 2, needs to fit its 
context. Although the empirical work of this case study finished in 2012, I have 
kept in contact with the involved companies afterwards. As an update, the 
company CL started a project to insource the Service Desk from SP1 in 2015, so 
that multiple vendors can be directly managed by the client itself, instead of being 
managed through SP1. Therefore, some key findings and recommendations of this 
study has indeed been taken into consideration and business practice. 
Table 12 Vendor structure for the multi-sourcing case 
 Case observations Suggested structure 
Multi-sourcing 
Model 




Task Allocation SP2 takes over part of SP1’s 
previous tasks, while still being 
governed under SP1. (Paper 4) 
The tasks of SP1 and SP2 should 
be separated, and both governed 




According to the Guardian 
Vendor Model (Paper 4) 
Low 
To mitigate conflicts caused by 
the internal differences of 
vendors 
                                                 
1 The dashed arrow line in the figure illustrates the interaction between CL and SP2, which is outside the 









5.4 Limitations and future research 
Although the findings are interesting and valuable for both research and practice, 
the limitation areas must be acknowledged where future research is encouraged. 
First, the design of single case study, although common in both SNA and 
qualitative research, is still considered as a limitation in this study. Indeed, 
focusing on a single site has enabled a deep investigation with rich contextual 
information; to avoid the danger of over-generalization, the inference of findings 
must bear the specific context into consideration, which is in turn an essential part 
of findings. Thus, for other contexts (e.g. with different sized participants and 
contracts, different numbers of client and vendors, different geographical 
locations, etc.) the generalizability of this study is limited and uncertain. To 
increase the scope of generalization, further studies are needed in other empirical 
sites, especially those with different multi-sourcing models and characteristics of 
participants.  
The second limitation lies in the cross-sectional nature of the case study. 
Although the empirical work lasted for half a year in 2012, it is still considered as 
a snapshot in the entire history of this multi-sourcing relationship. Before the 
beginning of this research, the cooperation between the client and each vendor had 
already lasted for several years; after I left the empirical site, the multi-sourcing 
relationship also continued for more years. Therefore, the findings of this study 
relies on the happenings during the data collection period, and the retrospective 
memories of interviewees on the past years. Considering that the perceptions and 
practice may evolve during the entire lifecycle of the relationship, a longitudinal 
study tracking the full contract period is necessary in future studies to strengthen 
the reliability of findings. 
Last but not least, there should be room to improve the design of the SNA 
questionnaire used in this study. Especially in the QAP analysis, the high absolute 
correlation values should have been caused by the design of questionnaire, in 
which the multiplexity of network is selected by respondents based on the same 
pool of candidates. For instance, each respondent was asked to indicate different 
interaction types with the 5 most frequently contacted colleagues whom she/he 
already selected in the last question. This design was mainly caused by the 
limitation of the survey tool Webropol, which does not seamlessly support matrix-
like questions for SNA. However, as the related findings are on the basis of cross-
network comparison instead of absolute coefficient values, the extrapolations are 
still valid despite this limitation. Nevertheless, in future studies with similar SNA 
purpose, the tool to conduct questionnaire needs to be reconsidered, in order to 
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